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This study examines the influence of executives’ prior employment ties on 
unrelated acquisitions. I do this by considering the relational ties created by both the oft-
studied board interlock as well as the hitherto unconsidered executive prior employment. 
By considering both tie types, I am able to examine the new inter-firm relational tie 
variable next to a well-established relational network variable. Therefore, I collected 
data on all of the executive prior employment ties and board interlocks to unrelated 
industries for all of the public, U.S. firms in the ‘computers and office equipment’ 
industry from 2002-2014. Results show that a relational tie to an unrelated industry 
through either a board interlock or executive prior employment does increase the 
likelihood of acquiring an unrelated target in that same industry, although the latter has a 
stronger influence. The rate of decay of the prior employment tie is assessed and found 
to be quite slow. The amount of time spent building ties with co-workers in the unrelated 
industry has no impact on the effect, suggesting that most prior employment ties are 
strong enough for knowledge transfer. Finally, the surprising result that sent executive 
prior employment ties possess comparable influence to their received counterparts, is 
outlined, meaning that an executive exiting to another industry can be just as influential 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
A great deal of research has focused on why firms make acquisitions. This is in 
part because acquisitions often represent a significant investment. Demonstrating this is 
the fact that the worldwide total sum that firms spent to complete acquisitions in 2006 
was $3.79 trillion (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). The amount firms spend on worldwide 
acquisitions continues to expand, reaching an estimated $4.58 trillion in 2015 (Mattioli 
& Strumpf, 2015). With so many financial resources being used to complete 
acquisitions, this is understandably an area of much scholarly inquiry that is of interest to 
shareholders in both acquiring and acquired firms. 
Researchers have considered many antecedents as a means to explain the 
reasoning for companies choosing to spend trillions of dollars annually to acquire other 
firms. Two common findings in these studies are that firms engage in acquisitions to 
increase executive compensation and to diversify the scope of their operations 
(Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Executive compensation 
has been shown to increase, post-acquisition, through sizable equity grants (Harford & 
Li, 2007) and bonuses (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). These compensation increases are 
particularly beneficial for the CEO (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001) and are often made 
regardless of the performance of the acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2009).  
Another antecedent for acquisitions is the desire to diversify the firm’s scope of 




companies” (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001: 116). Firms may diversify their product 
line to take advantage of economies of scale and scope or to increase their market power 
(Chakrabarti, Hauschildt, & Süverkrüp, 1994). Acquisitions can enable firms to diversify 
their product lines faster and cheaper than developing new products internally (Hitt et 
al., 2001). More recently, studies suggest firms can also diversify through acquisitions 
for the purposes of imitating competitors’ actions (Yang & Hyland, 2006) or to increase 
political clout (Beneish, Jansen, Lewis, & Stuart, 2008). 
Still, in spite of all we have learned as a field about these acquisition antecedents 
and others (e.g., managerial hubris, government regulation, resource redeployment – see 
Haleblian et al., 2009 for full list), a recent meta-analysis found that there are still 
unidentified acquisition variables that may explain significant variance in post-
acquisition performance (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). I contend that a type of 
inter-firm relational ties, that have not been considered previously, may account for 
some of the unexplained variance associated with acquisition outcomes. Indeed, prior 
research has found inter-firm relational ties to be an antecedent to acquisitions (e.g., 
Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). Specifically, researchers have already considered 
the influence on acquisition activity of relational ties created across firms through 
directors serving on multiple boards (commonly called board interlocks). For instance, 
the number of current acquisitions completed by the focal firm was found to be 
positively related to the number of prior acquisitions completed by the firms tied to the 




changes in acquisition activity of firms linked by interlocks were positively related to 
changes in the focal firm’s acquisition activity (Haleblian et al., 2009). 
Social capital theory suggests that relational ties serve as a conduit for 
information and knowledge transfer1 (Burt, 1992). Both the early ideas of weak tie 
theory (Granovetter, 1973) and the more recent concept of structural holes (Burt, 1992), 
support the notion that a relational tie that bridges distinct groups has an informational 
benefit (Podolny, 2001). Researchers found this to be the case for acquisitions, with the 
positive relationship between interlocked firms’ acquisition activity shown to be due to 
the information flowing through the board interlocks (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  
The purpose of this study is to examine a new type of inter-firm relational tie: 
executives’ prior employment ties. While researchers have studied intra-firm ties to co-
workers at both the employee (e.g., Maurer, Bartsch, & Ebers, 2011) and executive 
levels (e.g., Carpenter, 2002), those same ties are rarely considered once the focal actor 
changes firms (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010). However, recent research has shown that 
exiting employees retain social ties with their former co-workers and those ties are 
strong enough for knowledge flow (Agrawal, Cockburn, & McHale, 2006; Corredoira & 
Rosenkopf, 2010). This means that as executives move between firms, they create inter-
                                                 
1 It is important to point out that the literature on relational ties and social capital has largely used 
‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ interchangeably. While in a broader context, knowledge is the subset of 
information that is in someone’s brain (and thus known), this distinction largely disappears within the 
context of relational tie transference. For information to pass between two individuals it must at least be 
known to the sender. Even in the case of information contained in a database or book, the sender must still 
have enough of a general knowledge of the information contained in the external source to identify it as 
information the receiver may want. Setting aside such issues as the receiver’s absorptive capacity to turn 
the sender’s transmitted knowledge into his/her own, at least on one side of the exchange it is fair to claim 
information and knowledge are synonymous. I therefore attempt to use the same terminology as that of the 





firm ties between their current and former employer(s). As this is a relatively unstudied 
type of relational tie, it raises the question: What is the best context to examine it? 
The informational benefit of relational ties most likely occurs when the groups 
are socially distant. Social distance between groups exists when there is little “overlap in 
their friendship circles” between members of group A and members of group B 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1362). Weak tie theory (Granovetter, 1973) argues that members of 
socially close groups tend to possess redundant information (i.e., each member’s 
information is the same as the other members) and therefore (‘weak’) ties to a socially 
distant group are likely to form valuable bridges to new information. Similarly, Burt 
(1992: 20) observed that “[informational] redundancy is unlikely, indicating a structural 
hole, between… distant groups.” Therefore, an inter-firm relational tie is more likely to 
provide an informational benefit the greater the social distance between the two firms. 
Firms operating in unrelated industries will tend to have a higher social distance 
(less relational overlap) than do firms operating in related industries or those within the 
same industry. Industries are commonly classified as ‘related’ or ‘unrelated’ based on 
the similarity (or complementarity) of their product lines and/or the markets they serve. 
The individuals employed at a firm will tend to have more interactions with individuals 
employed at other firms within the same industry than individuals employed at firms 
competing in unrelated industries. These numerous interactions contribute to a shared 
common ‘industry knowledge’ that is largely redundant for all firms within the industry. 
This is similarly true, though to a lesser extent, across firms in related industries. 




industries, the knowledge shared across such ties is less likely to be redundant with 
knowledge in the focal industry. “Information, opinion, and practice are more 
homogeneous within than between groups, so a manager whose network spans structure 
[sic] holes (call him a network broker, connector, or entrepreneur) has a vision 
advantage in early exposure to diverse information” (Burt, 2007: 119). 
Therefore, I contend that an executive’s relational ties to a firm in an unrelated 
industry provide an informational conduit to valuable, non-redundant information that 
increases the likelihood of acquiring targets in that industry. In this case, an executive’s 
relational ties to a firm in an unrelated industry provides an informational conduit to that 
firm’s shared common (non-focal) ‘industry knowledge’ for the focal firm, that is not 
widely known within the focal industry. Access to the ‘industry knowledge’ of a specific 
unrelated industry improves the focal firm’s ability to identify attractive acquisition 
targets in that industry. Such knowledge also reduces the informational asymmetry of an 
acquisition in that industry location compared to other unrelated industries for the focal 
firm. For example, CNET Networks (a website that reports on technology and reviews 
consumer electronics) hired an executive from Bank of America three years before 
acquiring its first firm from the banking industry.  
In addition to investigating the influence of executives’ prior employment ties on 
unrelated acquisitions, I also hypothesize the existence of three potential moderators of 
this relationship. First, I examine how quickly prior ties decay with time, as a general 
rate of tie decay is unknown (Adler & Kwon, 2002). For the most part, scholars have 




However, Levin et al. (2011) found that ties to individuals without contact for at least 
three years were still easily accessible for information. Similarly, relational ties from 
university days have been shown to provide valuable social capital many years later 
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008). Both of these findings suggest that relational ties 
decay slowly, but little work has been completed to empirically estimate a rate of decay.  
Second, I consider the impact of the strength of the prior tie when the executive 
exited the prior employer, as tie strength can affect information exchange (Uzzi, 1996). 
“Ties can be more or less preferential and stable, more or less trustworthy, and entail 
richer or more limited information exchange” (Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012: 529). 
Since the exchange of valuable industry information is vital to influencing acquisition 
activity, an executive’s relational ties to former co-workers must be of sufficient strength 
for this to occur. Establishing a minimum necessary threshold of prior tie strength for 
sufficient information exchange could also further illuminate our understanding of tie 
decay. 
Third, as relational ties allow for bidirectional knowledge flow (Corredoira & 
Rosenkopf, 2010), I examine which direction of the executive prior employer tie has a 
stronger influence. I borrow the terminology of ‘sent’ and ‘received’ ties routinely used 
in interlock research (Palmer, Barber, Zhou, & Soysal, 1995) to describe the direction of 
the executive mobility between firms. That is, is the focal firm the current (received tie) 
or prior (sent tie) employer for the executive in question? While sent ties isolate the 
social capital influence of the former executive (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010), 




on the focal firm’s acquisition activity. Therefore, theoretically, it seems obvious to 
predict received ties as the stronger influence, but I will put that prediction to the test. I 
summarize my hypothesized relationships in a visual model in Figure 1. 
This study examines the influence of executives’ prior employment ties on 
unrelated acquisitions. It does this by considering the relational ties created by both the 
oft-studied board interlock as well as the hitherto unconsidered executive prior 
employment. By considering both tie types, I am able to examine the new inter-firm 
relational tie variable next to a well-established relational network variable. Therefore, I 
collected all of the executive prior employment ties and board interlocks to unrelated 
industries for all of the public, U.S. firms in the ‘computers and office equipment’ 
industry from 2002-2014. I also captured the number of years of experience at the prior 
employer, the number of years since leaving the prior employer, and the tie direction 
(sent or received) to allow for moderation analysis. These data were analyzed to 
determine their influence on unrelated acquisitions in those industries. Results show that 
a relational tie to an unrelated industry through either a board interlock or executive 
prior employment does increase the likelihood of acquiring an unrelated target in that 
same industry, although the latter has a stronger influence. The age of the prior 
employment tie decreases this effect, suggesting tie decay occurs. The amount of time 
spent building ties with co-workers in the unrelated industry has no impact on the effect, 
suggesting that most prior employment ties are strong enough for knowledge transfer. 




suggesting the influence of the ties is primarily from social capital and not human 
capital. 
By empirically examining how executives’ prior employment ties relate to firm 
acquisition behavior, my study contributes to existing theory and research in several 
ways. First, I contribute to the acquisition literature by identifying a previously unknown 
variable of executive prior employment ties that explains significant variance in 
unrelated acquisition activity. This is particularly noteworthy as this new type of inter-
firm relational tie appears to have a stronger influence than board interlocks, the study of 
which has contributed a considerable amount to our understanding of acquisition 
behavior. This raises the question as to whether prior studies included enough ties to 
capture adequately the relational network structure (Burt, 2007). This means that in prior 
research, the influence of board interlocks may be overstated. 
I add to the diversification literature by considering the industry location of the 
unrelated acquisition target. Diversification research has found that unrelated 
acquisitions can be used to balance the cyclical effects of revenue between industries 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Bergh, 1997). Further, unrelated acquisitions can lower the cost 
of capital (Chatterjee, 1986), or create other financial gains (Bergh, 1997; Seth, 1990). 
However, while diversification can help explain firms’ engaging in unrelated, instead of 
related, acquisitions, it rarely considers what influences a firm to choose one unrelated 
industry over another. This study expands our understanding of other factors in the 




I also contribute to the social capital literature in several ways. First, I add to our 
understanding of relational tie decay. While a few recent findings suggest that relational 
tie decay may be slow (Cohen et al., 2008; Levin et al., 2011), to my knowledge, I am 
the first to empirically establish a decay rate. My findings show that the decay rate for 
prior ties is quite slow, suggesting that researchers should no longer ignore prior ties in 
their work. Next, I find confirmation for the bidirectional nature of knowledge flow 
across relational ties. My findings also suggest that this knowledge flow accounts for a 
majority of the influence of such ties. Finally, I expand social capital research on prior 
employment ties into the C-suite by testing it at the executive level. 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Next is a literature review 
(Chapter II) of pertinent previous work in the areas of acquisitions, social capital, and 
board interlocks. After this base is covered, I turn to new theory development and 
hypotheses (Chapter III) to explain the developed model of inter-industry relational ties 
within the context of unrelated acquisitions to determine the strategic implications. The 
methodology for testing this new theory is covered in the following chapter (IV), in 
which the sample of public firms in the ‘computers and office equipment’ industry, the 
investigated variables, and the analysis procedures, are explained. In Chapter V, I outline 
the study’s results. Finally, the dissertation concludes in Chapter VI with a discussion of 








“The core intuition guiding social capital research is that the goodwill that 
others have toward us is a valuable resource. By ‘goodwill’ we refer to the 
sympathy, trust, and forgiveness offered us by friends and acquaintances.” 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002: 18) 
A great deal of research has focused on social capital – the resources embedded 
in relational networks (Leana & Pil, 2006). A recent review (Woolcock, 2010) points to 
a prevalence of studies in nine fields, including our own, of ‘work and organizations’. 
Social capital has been examined by management scholars in many areas, including 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Slotte-Kock & Coviello, 2010), knowledge management (e.g., 
Maurer et al., 2011), and inter-firm relationships (e.g., Sorenson & Rogan, 2014). 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identified three dimensions of social capital: 
structural, relational, and cognitive. ‘Structural embeddedness’ concerns the properties 
of the entire relational network and an actor’s position in it (e.g., Burt, 1992). 
‘Relational’ embeddedness’ concerns the content of those ties, such as trust, which 
develop through repeated interactions (e.g., Putnam, 1993). Finally, ‘cognitive 
embeddedness’ concerns the types of shared meaning that can develop, such as shared 




Sandefur and Laumann (1998) identify the three benefits of social capital as 
information, influence, and solidarity. Similarly, Uzzi (1997) classified the three 
attributes of relational embeddedness as information exchange, trust, and joint problem 
solving. Informational benefits are derived from the timeliness, relevance (Burt, 1992) 
and trustworthiness (Laumann & Knoke, 1987) of the information. Influential benefits 
are derived both from one’s ability to influence others (Coleman & Coleman, 1994) and 
one’s freedom from such influence from others (Sandefur & Laumann, 1998). The 
benefits of solidarity are derived from a mutual trust and commitment beyond that of the 
transaction (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993).  
Social Capital Sources of Information 
Social capital research has focused on two sources of informational access. 
‘Bonding’ forms of social capital focus on the internal ties within groups while bridging’ 
forms of social capital focus on external ties to other groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
‘Bonding’ social capital considers informational access based on centrality of the focal 
actor within the overall network (e.g., Ahuja, 2000). Meanwhile, ‘bridging’ social capital 
considers informational access based on ‘weak’ ties (Granovetter, 1973), or spanning 
structural holes (Burt, 1992) that bridge distinct groups within the network.  
Higher levels of network centrality2 increase the firm’s access to information 
(Ahuja, 2000). Specifically discussing board interlocks, Martin, Gozubuyuk, and 
Becerra (2015: 238) state “a central position in the interlocking network also allows the 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that centrality has been operationalized as “betweenness (information control) 
centrality (Madhavan, 1996)” and “degree (number of partners) centrality (Ahuja, 2000)” (Koka & 




firm to convey information to its partners, improving the coordination of its activities 
with other organizations –such as suppliers, customers, and competitors– in order to 
reduce possible fluctuations in resource requirements, demand, and prices”  
However, the additional information from a more central position may be 
redundant (Burt, 1992). As the network of ties approaches 100% density (i.e., all 
potential ties formed, which in this study would be all firms connected to every unrelated 
industry), the number of structural holes decreases and the number of redundant 
information paths increases. So while centrality can increase the information available to 
the actor, it does not guarantee that information is diverse. 
In contrast, more structural holes in a network create a situation with diverse 
information in different node clusters (Podolny, 2001). “A structural hole is said to exist 
between two alters who are not connected to each other. According to structural holes 
theory, it is advantageous for ego to be connected to many alters who are themselves 
unconnected to the other alters in ego's network” (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). In a 
network analysis, the focal individual is referred to as the ‘ego’ (or ‘actor’) with those 
tied to him or her called ‘alters’ (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982). As Martin et al. (2015) 
explain: 
“An ego-network rich in structural holes provides two benefits: information 
and control (Podolny, 2001). Information benefits suggest access to diverse 
and timely information as well as access to referrals (Burt, 1992). This 
information reduces firm uncertainty regarding how best to combine resources 
and realize market opportunities (Podolny, 2001). Control stems from the 
central actor being tertius gaudens or “the third who benefits” (Simmel, 




players after the same relationship, and being the third between players in two 
or more relations with conflicting demands” (Burt, 1992: 31). Firms may 
achieve power through their structural position following either of these two 
tertius strategies that allow them to exert control over other organizations 
(Burt, 2004).”  
Those bridging structural holes prosper through the advantageous position such 
an information bridge creates. “Information, opinion, and practice are more 
homogeneous within than between groups, so a manager whose network spans structure 
[sic] holes (call him a network broker, connector, or entrepreneur) has a vision 
advantage in early exposure to diverse information and a general political advantage as a 
hub in the information flow” (Burt, 2007: 119). 
Similar to network centrality, Burt's (1992) structural holes argument does not 
focus on the characteristics of an actor's individual ties, but on the characteristics of the 
network as a whole and the actor’s part in it. This means research on structural holes has 
targeted relative network attributes (the amount of structural holes bridged) instead of 
specific network bridges.  
Tie Types 
“Social network researchers regard relationships, or ties, as the basic data for 
analysis. A network can be defined as the pattern of ties linking a defined set of persons 
or social actors. Each person can be described in terms of his or her links with other 
people in the network” (Seibert et al., 2001: 220). Management scholars have considered 
these relational networks both indirectly through inferred ties (e.g., Higgins & Gulati, 




ties of top executives have considered both intra-firm networks (e.g., Carpenter & Wade, 
2002) and inter-firm networks (e.g., Haynes & Hillman, 2010). 
To date, scholars have examined the social capital of executives in two ways: 
through the networks of observable relational ties or inferred ties based on an observable 
association. Associations used to infer relational capital include the “frequently used 
measures of network social capital such as the education and occupational prestige of 
network members” (Mouw, 2003: 873). These measures of prestige are usually a binary 
categorization. For instance, an affiliation with a prestigious organization, such as 
possessing an Ivy league education, signals greater social capital than those without such 
an affiliation (e.g., Higgins & Gulati, 2006). In addition to universities, researchers may 
determine that prestige is associated with affiliation with certain banks, venture capital 
firms, and charities. “Because executives and outside directors are engaged in the actual 
functioning of young firms, any prestigious credentials they possess are thought to 
represent valuable expertise and connections (i.e., both ‘human capital’ and ‘social 
capital’)” (Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008: 955). While a coarse assessment of social 
capital, such measures allow researchers to establish a relative amount of social capital 
held by executives based on an observable affiliation, when gathering the underlying 
relational network is not possible or practical. There are, of course, limits to such 
measures of social capital especially when considering multiple types of prestigious 
affiliations. For instance, the value of the social capital from differing prestigious 
affiliations for IPOs is contingent on market conditions. That is, Gulati and Higgins 




to IPO success during cold markets, while ties to prominent investment banks are 
particularly beneficial to IPO success during hot markets.” 
Other studies examine the social capital through the networks of observable 
relational ties. For example, board interlocks consider the inter-firm tie that is 
established by the observable relationships formed through the directors interacting 
during board meetings (e.g., Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, & Ellstrand, 2011). 
Researchers generally choose only one type of relational tie to construct a network. 
However, a few studies have combined multiple types of ties into a single network (e.g., 
Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  
There are many types of observable ties considered in prior studies. Such ties 
include, but are not limited to, friendship ties within the board (e.g., Hoitash, 2011; 
Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Westphal, 1999) and interlocking directorate ties across 
boards (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). This leads to the next 
subdivision of social capital research: intra-firm and inter-firm networks. 
Researchers have considered several types of intra-firm relational ties of 
executives and directors. For example, scholars found greater amounts of intra-firm 
social capital of the top management team translated into greater pay for the non-CEO 
executives (Carpenter & Wade, 2002). Further, the intra-firm social capital of the top 
management team was found to reduce the impact of their demographic differences 
(Carpenter, 2002).  
Scholars have also considered the intra-firm relational ties within the board of 




on the compensation committee were linked to increased executive compensation 
(Hoitash, 2011). Further, Hoitash (2011) found social ties between executive board 
members and independent board members on the audit committee improved financial 
reporting and reduced restatements. Westphal and Bednar (2005: 262) found friendship 
ties among board members reduced the occurrence of the “systematic tendency for 
outside directors to underestimate the extent to which fellow directors share their 
concerns about the viability of the firm’s corporate strategy” on boards. Friendship ties 
between the CEO and other board members also increased the level of advice and 
number of counsel interactions they received on strategic issues (Westphal, 1999). In 
another recent example, Sundaramurthy and colleagues found that similarities between 
the CEO's and the board's human and social capital created synergies which reduced IPO 
underpricing (Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong, & Kor, 2014). 
Researchers have also considered inter-firm relational ties of executives and 
directors. Since the first empirical studies in the late 1980s, research into the importance 
of inter-firm relationships on the performance and behavior of firms has grown 
substantially (Sorenson & Rogan, 2014). In this area, strategy researchers have primarily 
considered board interlocks. As Haunschild and Beckman (1998: 815) point out: “One of 
the most-studied forms of interorganizational influence is the director interlock.” For 
instance, Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) found some interlocks (only neutral ties) to 
encourage the adoption of the multidivisional form in the 1960s. Researchers have also 
found that market uncertainty can influence forming additional interlock ties to existing 




firms whose executives sat on the boards of other firms that engaged in acquisitions 
were more likely to engage in acquisitions themselves.  
To date, the extant acquisition literature has rarely considered inter-firm 
relational ties beyond board interlocks and may be ignoring other important relational 
ties. There have been few exceptions to this narrow focus on interlocking directorates 
such as Haunschild (1994) considering ties to investment banking professionals in 
addition to interlocks in predicting acquisition premiums. This singular focus has led to 
“external directorship ties [as] the most well-studied of all forms of executive ties” 
(Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001: 890), but little is known of the other relational 
ties of executives. These previously ignored ties are important if they represent 
alternative or additional pathways for information flow. For instance, Haunschild and 
Beckman (1998) found that alternate relational sources of information (e.g., CEO 
membership in the Business Round-table) reduced the impact of the interlock on 
acquisition activity. This suggests that differing types of ties that connect the firm to the 
same ‘other’ (e.g., individual, firm, investment bank) can act as substitutes for each 
other. On the other hand, if the ignored ties create additional connections beyond those 
made by the interlocks, researchers may not be including enough ties to adequately 
capture the relational network structure (Burt, 2007). That is, what appears to be a 
structural hole may actually be full of the ignored ties (Levin et al., 2011). 
Board Interlocks 
“The board interlock network has been viewed as an ideal arena in which to 




relations. The board of directors is a unique formal mechanism linking top 
managers of large corporations; it provides an opportunity for leaders to 
exchange information, observe the leadership practices and style of their 
peers, and witness firsthand the consequences of those practices. Thus, from 
this perspective, board ties to other firms should have a strong influence over 
corporate policy and strategy decisions.” (Gulati & Westphal, 1999: 473) 
Researchers have long been interested in board interlocks and their influence on 
a variety of firm outcomes (Mizruchi, 1996; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, 2015). For 
instance, Davis (1991) found that firms more central in the interlock network were more 
likely to adopt ‘poison pill’ defenses against corporate takeovers. Researchers have 
found that firm uncertainty can influence forming new alliances (but not new interlock) 
ties to new firms, while market uncertainty can influence forming additional alliance and 
interlock ties to existing partner firms (Beckman et al., 2004). Palmer et al. (1993) found 
some interlocks (only neutral ties) to encourage the adoption of the multidivisional form 
in the 1960s among large U.S. industrial firms. Haunschild (1993), in a study across four 
industries, found that executives sat on the boards of other firms that engaged in 
acquisitions were more likely to engage in acquisitions at the focal firm. Finally, Peng 
(2004) found that during institutional transitions (in China) outside directors positively 
affect sales growth but have little effect on return on equity.  
Several studies have also considered the importance of a nonfinancial firm’s 
interlock with a bank. That is, to have a commercial or investment bank director serving 
on their board. Evidence suggests that bank interlocks increase the firm’s amount of 




targets of takeovers (Fligstein & Brantley, 1992), but more likely to be acquired in a 
‘friendly’ than a ‘predatory’ fashion (Palmer et al., 1995). 
These interlock ties have been found to “provide information about the activities 
of the other organization that may be crucial for the focal organization, e.g., strategic 
plans and cost and price structure (Baum and Ingram, 2003; Boyd, 1990; Galbraith, 
1973; Haunschild, 1994; Podolny, 2001)” (Martin et al., 2015). In addition to 
information about the activities of other firms, the success or failure of those activities 
also transfers across board ties prompting or suppressing similar actions at the focal firm 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Research has shown that interlocks also give access to “external 
resources” (Boyd, 1990; Gulati, 1999; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). 
“Attention is focused on external directorship ties as they are the most well- 
studied of all forms of executive ties” (Geletkanycz et al., 2001: 890). There have been a 
few exceptions to this narrow focus on interlocking directorates. For example, 
Haunschild (1994) examined ties to investment banking professionals in addition to 
interlocks. Zaheer and Bell (2005) considered the ‘management ties’ of mutual fund 
parents and subsidiaries in addition to board interlocks. Finally, a study took place that 
examined ties to former employers, in addition to interlocks, to predict strategic 
conformity to industry norms (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). 
The following chapter starts with this background of research in mind and builds 
theoretical arguments specific to this study. First, I cover the idea of social distance as it 




about their influence on unrelated acquisitions. Lastly, I propose the existence of three 





CHAPTER III  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT & HYPOTHESIS 
 
Social Distance 
An early conceptualization of social capital, weak tie theory (Granovetter, 1973), 
focuses on the strength of ties and their likelihood of overlap between various social 
groups. Granovetter (1973) argued that the strength of a tie between two individuals 
tends to increase the more those two individuals’ social circles overlap:  
“Consider, now, any two arbitrarily selected individuals-call them A and B-
and the set, S = C, D, E, ..., of all persons with ties to either or both of them. 
The hypothesis which enables us to relate dyadic ties to larger structures is: 
the stronger the tie between A and B, the larger the proportion of individuals 
in S to whom they will both be tied, that is, connected by a weak or strong tie. 
This overlap in their friendship circles is predicted to be least when their tie is 
absent, most when it is strong, and intermediate when it is weak.” 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1362). 
Granovetter (1973: 1364) further argued that because individuals in social 
cliques tend to possess redundant information, it is likely such “weak” ties form valuable 
“bridges” – “a line in a network which provides the only path between two points”– 
between densely interconnected social groups. Such bridges thus provide unique 
information and resources. 
The notion of structural holes (Burt, 1992) has largely subsumed the early work 




connector between unconnected groups (Seibert et al., 2001). That is, the bridge that 
‘spans a structural hole’. Such bridges prosper by becoming information brokers: 
“information arbitrage is essential to the idea that network brokerage provides social 
capital” (Burt, 2007: 122).  
However, Burt's (1992) ‘structural holes’ approach does not focus on the 
characteristics of the actor's direct ties (e.g., tie strength), but on the characteristics of the 
network as a whole and the actor’s part in it. This means that research on bridging ties 
has focused on relative network attributes instead of tie attributes. To date, such 
structural social capital studies have focused primarily on the amount of structural holes 
spanned by particular person or firm; that is, how many bridging ties does the focal 
manager or firm pose? For instance, the more structural holes that an investment bank 
bridges, the greater its status accumulation (Shipilov & Li, 2008). Vasudeva, Zaheer, and 
Hernandez (2013: 645) found that a “firm spanning structural holes obtains the greatest 
innovation benefits when the firm (the broker) or its alliance partners are based in highly 
corporatist countries.” Zaheer and Bell (2005) found that structural holes increase firm 
performance, but even more so if that firm also has innovative capabilities.  
While structural holes research has reframed the underlying theory to focus on 
bridging ties as determined by network attributes instead of tie attributes, it has not 
overturned Granovetter’s (1973) notion of bridges often connecting socially distant 
circles (Levin et al., 2011). “Redundancy is unlikely, indicating a structural hole, 
between total strangers in distant groups” (Burt, 1992: 20). Therefore, ties to more 




third parties. This theoretical basis allows one to predict which ties likely span structural 
holes based on a tie’s characteristics instead of the overall network’s structure. That is, 
the social distance between the two groups the tied actors are within.  
There are advantages and limitations to this focus on network attributes instead 
of tie attributes. The advantage of focusing on network attributes is that one can ensure 
that an apparent bridging tie is, in fact, spanning a structural hole and not linking to a 
group otherwise connected through structural equivalence (Burt, 1992). That is, one can 
ensure that a structural hole is, in fact, a structural hole. However, this is contingent on 
including enough ties to adequately capture the network structure (Burt, 2007, Merluzzi 
& Burt, 2013).  
Network attribute analysis is only as good as its representation of the entirety of 
the ties present (Burt, 2007). That is, omitting ties from the network analysis can create 
false attributes. As pointed out earlier, an apparent structural hole may in fact, be 
connected by multiple inactive (currently neglected, but potentially reconnected) ties 
(Levin et al., 2011). Beyond excluding inactive ties, this problem of inadequately 
capturing the network can also stem from not including other types of active ties in the 
analysis. For instance, an apparent structural hole in the inter-firm network of board 
interlocks could, in fact, be bridged by active ties to the same investment bank. In this 
case, the ties to the mutual investment bank could act as a substitute for the missing (in 
this example) interlock ties. 
Further, network attributes can vary based on the network boundary. That is, the 




a subset of a wider network of related industries ties. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the information a node offers is a function of the other nodes beyond it in the 
network. Second, there may be additional indirect ties to firms within a single industry 
that are tied through firms outside that industry. In this example, the firm in question 
would have less centrality when considering a single industry network than a multi-
industry network. Similarly, such a firm’s relative access to novel information is 
different based on where the inter-firm network’s boundary was drawn.  
The other limitation to the analysis of network attributes is that it does not allow 
the examination of individual bridging ties, as they are considered in aggregate. As 
mentioned above, structural network studies focus on the amount of bridging ties 
possessed by the actor (e.g., firm) rather than the benefits of a specific bridging tie (e.g., 
Shipilov & Li, 2008). 
In contrast, focusing on tie attributes does not present these same limitations. A 
tie’s attributes are independent from the inclusion or exclusion of other ties from the 
network considered. Further, attributes of ties are unaffected by the position of the 
network’s boundary. 
Another advantage of using ties’ social distance instead of network attributes to 
identify structural holes is that it provides the ability to consider different bridges of 
structural holes, individually. While much research has focused on the benefits of 
spanning more structural holes than others in the network (e.g., Batjargal, 2010; 




structural hole over another. This allows examination of how differences between 
various structural holes influence a strategic outcome.  
In general, more socially distant ties, such as those to an unrelated industry, are 
less likely to be redundant and therefore bridge structural holes within the network. 
Further, distant ties are more likely to provide novel information and knowledge to the 
industry. For instance, Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) found that executives' intra-
industry ties were related to firm strategies conforming to industry norms while inter-
industry ties were related to strategies that deviated from those norms. These findings 
support the idea that ties to the firms outside the industry provided information and ideas 
that differed from those common (redundant) within the industry. 
It is important to consider that social capital theory warns of a limit to the 
relationship between higher social distance and valuable information. The “risk [is] that 
socially distant actors will not value one another’s resources” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2008: 905). Information that is too far outside industry norms, that is, that goes against 
too many conventions or assumptions might be dismissed out of hand. A parallel in the 
social sciences would be that new research must attack ‘the taken-for-granted’ to be 
interesting, but not attack so many assumptions as to be disregarded (Davis, 1971). It is 
possible that executives from industries too far removed from the focal one will have 
trouble convincing their new firm of the value of ideas, processes, and opportunities that 
flow through a tie to an unrelated industry, as they are too far outside of the current 
norms. Similarly, executives at the focal firm may have more difficulty absorbing and 




In the context of this study, however, there is an inherent upper bound in the 
social distance of the executive inter-firm ties. While ties’ extreme levels of social 
distance will likely provide information too far outside the bounds of industry thinking, 
it is less likely that such ties would be connected in the first place. Certainly, the hiring 
process would greatly reduce the number of executives brought in with totally unrelated 
prior work experience. While such moves do occasionally occur to ‘shake things up’, 
they are rare. The social distance of board interlocks, while potentially more relaxed, are 
likely to have a similar upper bound on social distance due to the selection process. 
Therefore, the selection process for executives and directors should eliminate worries of 
inter-firm ties with information that because of too high a social distance is not 
transferred. 
An important question emerges, though; namely, how can a researcher establish 
the social distance between various industries?3 To examine the social distance of 
specific ties, I borrow from the human capital literature on transferability. The varying 
degrees of transferability of human capital across firms has been long a part of the 
academic conversation through the various types of human capital. “Human capital 
theory distinguishes between general human capital, which is applicable to many 
organizational contexts, and firm-specific human capital, which is valuable only to a 
specific organization (Becker, 1962). The firm specificity of workers’ skills is the degree 
                                                 
3 There is a network path ‘distance’ or shortest number of ties between nodes that can be calculated 
mathematically. However, this is not the same as the social distance being considered as a bridging tie 
between two socially disparate groups will greatly reduce the path distance, but not necessarily cause the 




to which the human capital they acquired at a particular firm is idiosyncratic and 
therefore useless at other firms” (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008: 1214). However, 
scholars acknowledge that some skills are transferable across similar firms. For instance, 
Castanias and Helfat (1991: 160) describe “a hierarchy of three types of skills: (a) 
generic skills, defined as those that are transferable across industries, businesses, and 
firms, (b) type of business or industry—related skills, and (c) firm-specific skills.” The 
two scholars later added “‘related-industry’ skills that can be transferred outside of an 
industry to other industries that make related products or that utilize related resources 
and production” to their hierarchy of managerial skills (Castanias & Helfat, 2001: 663).  
The varying degrees of transferability give us an objective way to measure the 
social ‘distance’ of various actors, as they are nested within firms and industries. 
Therefore, inter-firm ties can be categorized into three levels of social distance with 
firms in unrelated industries being more distant than related industries that, in turn, are 
more distant than firms located within the focal industry. As current research often 
classifies acquisitions as related or unrelated based on the two firms’ primary Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) codes (Fan & Goyal, 2006), this allows for easy 
categorizing of industries as more or less socially distant. 
Prior Ties 
Researchers have considered the potential social capital of executives from their 
prior associations. The most commonly studied are prior educational associations, but 
prior employers have also been considered. However, such studies have only examined 




executive with a prestigious degree (i.e., Ivy League), has a greater amount of social 
capital than an executive without a prestigious degree. Similarly, an executive with prior 
employment by a Fortune 100 company will be considered to have more social capital. 
As in these examples, the prestige proxies of social capital are usually binary in nature. 
Thus, the study of executives’ relational ties of such prior associations has been coarse 
grained and limited. 
However, there has been some research investigating the prior relational ties of 
scientists and inventors. For instance, Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, and Brewer (1996) 
found that scientists at new biotech firms use the social networks from their prior 
university work to increase their learning. Likewise, (Bouty, 2000) found that social ties 
amongst R&D researchers, including those to past employers, fostered innovation. 
Finally, scholars found “knowledge flows to an inventor’s prior location are 
approximately 50% greater than if they had never lived there, suggesting that social 
relationships, not just physical proximity, are important for determining flow patterns” 
(Agrawal et al., 2006: 571). These studies show that prior relational ties can be 
important. 
To date, the relational ties of executives considered by researchers have been 
those that are observable as currently active. These are relationships that are within the 
context of the professional sphere with known interactions. For instance, directors on the 
same board will have interactions at publicly reported board meetings. Another example 
would be the relational ties to the investment banking professionals assisting with a 




as when a director leaves the board, those relational ties are no longer considered by 
scholars. 
It is likely that scholars have avoided prior relational ties because of the difficulty 
associated with determining if the relationships are continuing to be active. A 
professional context can often provide a known level of personal interaction such as 
directors attending quarterly board meetings or co-workers routinely interacting at the 
office. Meanwhile, a personal context is often much more opaque to scholarly 
observation. This creates a problem for the study of relational ties: are those ties still 
active? While it is certainly common to maintain relationships with people from prior 
professional settings, the majority of those relationships will become ‘neglected’ due to 
the constraints of time. Scholars have used other labels for ‘neglected’ relational ties 
including ‘inactive’, ‘latent’, and ‘dormant’. Regardless of label, these describe 
relational ties that have not been actively maintained for some time (e.g., Levin et al., 
2011 examined relationships neglected for at least three years). This relational ‘neglect’ 
is common because an average person accumulates thousands of relational ties but 
maintains fewer than two hundred active ties (Killworth, Johnsen, Bernard, Shelley, & 
McCarty, 1990). While executives may be able to actively maintain more relationships 
than average, they are still constrained by too few hours in the day to stay in contact with 
every past relationship. This high drop-off of active prior ties has led scholars to largely 
ignore them: 
“Losing touch is all too common… The finite limits of time, however, create a 
natural ceiling on the number of relationships that a person can actively 




relationships—even positive, rewarding relationships—end up neglected. 
Both practitioners and scholars have treated this type of “neglected” tie— and 
its ability to offer economic or other nonsocial benefits (i.e., its social 
capital)—as dead and irrelevant (Burt 1992, 2002; Coleman 1990)” (Levin et 
al., 2011: 923). 
However, these neglected ties should not be dismissed. A recent study found that 
executive MBA students’ ties to individuals with whom they had not spoken with for at 
least three years were just as readily consulted for advice as their ties that were still 
currently active (Levin et al., 2011). Meanwhile, other scholars found that old relational 
ties from college years proved valuable social capital many years later (to the tune of 
7.8% better investment returns for portfolio managers on firms with former classmates 
than those without) (Cohen et al., 2008). Therefore, ties that are neglected (currently 
inactive), can be reconnected in the short term (Levin et al., 2011). 
With the ability to reconnect neglected ties so readily, one must be careful when 
analyzing relational networks. Most network studies only include active ties and 
therefore omit ties that have become inactive. This can cause problems when considering 
network attributes such as structural holes. Many inactive ties may actually bridge an 
apparent structural hole between two groups (Levin et al., 2011). This suggests that prior 
ties –even older, potentially neglected ones– should be considered as a part of the 
complete relational network.  
Executive Prior Employment Ties 
An important type of prior relational tie scholars have overlooked is that from 




exiting the firm retain social ties with their former co-workers and those ties are strong 
enough for knowledge flow (Agrawal et al., 2006; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010). 
Other studies have found that professional service providers, such as accountants and 
lawyers, can bring their client relationships with them as they move between firms 
(Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008; Wezel, Cattani, & Pennings, 2006). Further, 
Somaya et al. (2008) found that losing and gaining an employee to/from a client were 
both good for the firm (due to more business from the client). Examining marketing 
managers and advertising clients, Broschak (2004: 632) found “strong evidence that the 
career mobility of managers and the market ties of firms are intertwined.” These studies 
show that an employee’s ties to prior employers are important, but little is known about 
the impact of knowledge flow through the prior employment relational ties of 
executives. 
Industry practices demonstrate the importance of the prior employment history of 
a firm’s executives. In the United States for example, SEC regulations require firms to 
list the five-year career histories of their managing officers on their S-1 filing (Higgins 
& Gulati, 2006). Meanwhile, practitioners highlight the employment backgrounds of the 
firm’s executives during a firm’s pre-IPO road show presentation (e.g., Lipman, 2000). 
These practices clearly show that prior executive employment is an important 
consideration for investors. 
Thus far, in one of the few studies available, researchers found that, “firms linked 
to the bank through executive migration were disproportionately likely to be recruited as 




are visited to learn their ‘best practices’. Further, Still & Strang (2009) found benchmark 
firms linked to the bank through executive prior employment were nearly twice as 
influential as other benchmark firms. The same study did not find board interlocks or 
geographic proximity to have the same effect. Boeker (1997) found the prior employer 
of executives within the semiconductor industry affected product market entry. That is, 
firms tended to launch new products from a new executive’s prior firm’s product lines. 
This tendency was stronger in firms with smaller and less tenured top management 
teams. Further, research has found that executives’ ties to their prior employers 
influenced firm strategy. That is, executives with prior employment from within the 
focal industry conformed to industry norms for strategy, while executives with prior 
employment from other industries deviated from those norms (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997). Outside of the findings of this handful of studies, we know relatively little about 
the influence of executive prior employment ties.  
Therefore, this study considers the influence of executives’ relational ties to an 
unrelated industry on unrelated acquisitions. There exists a shared ‘industry knowledge’, 
as it is widely known to those in the industry (and therefore redundant to industry 
members). However, as unrelated industries represent socially distant groups, the 
members of each industry possess information that is likely not redundant to the 
members of the other industry. Therefore, a relational tie that bridges these two socially 
distant groups would provide an informational conduit to valuable, non-redundant 
information (Burt, 1992, Granovetter, 1973). Such information could both help identify 




acquisition, thereby making them a more attractive target. Therefore, I contend that 
executives’ relational ties to an unrelated industry provide an informational conduit to 
valuable, non-redundant information that influences the likelihood of acquiring targets in 
that industry. 
Hypothesis 1: An executive prior employment tie to an unrelated industry 
increases the likelihood of an acquisition in that industry. 
Tie Decay 
“Social capital does not have a predictable rate of depreciation—for two 
reasons. First, while it may depreciate with nonuse (and with abuse), it does 
not depreciate with use… it normally grows and develops with use—for 
example, trust (which we argue is a key source of social capital) that is 
demonstrated today, typically will be reciprocated and amplified tomorrow. 
Second, while social capital sometimes is rendered obsolete by contextual 
changes (see Sandefur & Laumann, 1998, for examples), the rate at which this 
happens is typically unpredictable so that even conservative accounting 
principles cannot estimate a meaningful depreciation rate.” (Adler & Kwon, 
2002: 22) 
As Adler and Kwon point out, unlike physical capital, one cannot simply consult 
a depreciation table for social capital to assess its decay rate. However, social capital 
does decay over time. Over long periods of time, people eventually die and any 
resources embedded in their ties are eliminated. While this is obviously an extreme 
example, it demonstrates that eventually social capital expires. Alternatively, researchers 
up to this point have largely considered any neglected tie as irrelevant (e.g., Burt, 2002). 




between the two individuals, most studies ignore relational ties the moment professional 
contact is discontinued or, at least, likely minimized. This has left a rather large gap of 
time –from the moment a co-worker or co-director adds ‘former’ to that title, to their 
eventual demise– without much empirical investigation.  
A few studies have considered the decay rate of relational ties. In investigating 
neglected ties, Levin et al. (2011) was able to analyze the decay of ‘especially close’ ties 
over time. By comparing the respondents’ (until recently neglected) reconnected ties to 
their currently active ties, the researchers were able to ascertain the changes over time in 
the reconnected ties, relative to the current ones. This was possible as the reconnected 
ties were all considered to be individuals the respondents considered ‘especially close’ 
while current (actively maintained) ties included those to ‘especially close’, ‘distant’, 
and ‘in-between’ people. The results show that the reconnected ‘especially close’ ties’ 
level of trust had decayed to that of the current ‘in-between’ ties, but still above that of 
the current ‘distant’ ties. However, the reconnected ‘especially close’ ties’ level of 
shared perspective had not decayed and was similar to the current ‘especially close’ ties 
(Levin et al., 2011) Because the study was not initially designed to study the decay rates 
of neglected ties, this was the limit of what the researchers could assess through post-hoc 
analyses.  
Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella (2008) considered the decay of former 
government officials' human and social capital, who were appointed as outside (non-
employee) directors. Specifically, they examined the change in likelihood that a former 




government officials’ likelihood of joining corporate boards is time dependent; that is, 
over time and irrespective of chronological age, their attractiveness as directors tends to 
depreciate” (Lester et al., 2008: 1010). However, they also found two hazard rate peaks 
for former cabinet members: one immediately after leaving office and one about five 
years later. A similar, albeit smaller, dual peak was also found for former senators, but 
not for former members of the House (see Lester et al., 2008’s Figure 1 reproduced in 
the Appendix as Figure 2). Lester et al. (2008) suggested this second peak could be due 
to the initial board service ending and being replaced with new board seats, but they 
admitted this was speculative. Another issue as it pertains to my study are the many 
potential differences among the social capital from prior employment including an 
elected federal government official, member of the President of the United States’ 
cabinet and prior employment at another firm. The differences in the social capital, 
likely affect the decay rates of that social capital. 
Finally, Baum, McEvily, and Rowley (2012) considered the impact of time on 
both closure (embedding) and bridging ties of investment bank underwriting syndicates. 
Following a firm’s choice of a lead bank to oversee the underwriting responsibilities 
involved in issuing shares, “the lead bank invites additional investment banks to 
participate as co-leads in an underwriting syndicate as a means of spreading risk and 
acquiring industry-specific skills, investor contacts, and distribution capabilities that help 
the syndicate to reach a wider range of investors (Pollock et al. 2004)” (Baum et al., 
2012: 533). Germane to this study, they found that the benefits of bridging ties between 




formal ties between the banks, similar to a strategic alliance between firms. Further, the 
relationship was that of bridging tie age and bank market share. Therefore, the 
generalizability of their findings to that of executive relational ties and firm acquisitions 
is likely low.  
A better understanding of the decay rate of relational ties can help future 
researchers determine which ties should be included in the network analysis. Network 
scholars must be careful to sufficiently capture the whole network by including enough 
ties and enough tie types (Burt, 2007, Merluzzi & Burt, 2013). This is a reoccurring 
topic in the social capital literature. Burt (2007) raises it, discussing secondhand 
brokerage. Merluzzi and Burt (2013) discuss the practical tradeoffs of soliciting enough 
relationships to capture the network without becoming overly burdensome on 
respondents and researchers. Multiple dormant ties may bridge an apparent structural 
hole between two groups (Levin et al., 2011). With a ‘known’ decay rate, researchers 
could more easily assess what ‘age’ of ties needs to be included in a relational network 
analysis. Conversely, at what ‘age’ can relational ties be safely ignored? 
An additional consideration is the aggregate nature of the prior employment tie. 
A tie to a past employer represents ties to a multitude of individuals including former co-
workers, suppliers, buyers and even competitors (Bergh, 2001). In this study, individuals 
in the prior industry may retire or change industries themselves, thereby reducing the 
information flow from the industry due to context changes (Sandefur & Laumann, 
1998). In such cases, even though the relational tie between the focal executive and the 




information flow, as the non-focal individual is no longer employed in the industry in 
question their industry knowledge will start becoming outdated. Because of this, the 
decay rate of the non-focal industry information access may be faster than underlying 
relationships. However, due to the largely redundant nature of the information in 
question, it is more likely that the decay rate of the aggregated tie is slower than the 
average relationship, as a single prior industry contact could potentially supply similar 
information to multiple contacts. Therefore, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the time since the executive left the prior industry, the 
weaker the relationship between executive prior industry ties and acquisitions in 
that industry.  
Beyond the idea that neglected relational ties decay over time. There is at issue 
how quickly (slowly) that decay occurs and therefore what aged ties should be 
considered by researchers. Given the aggregate nature of the executive prior 
employment tie and the available empirical findings on tie decay, I contend that the 
influence of executive prior employment ties will be long lasting. Of course, to be 
testable I must assign a reasonable number to ‘long lasting’. For this I turn to CEO 
tenure, the mean of which was at 6.8 years in publicly traded firms in 2007 (Patel & 
Cooper, 2014). If the decay rate is slow enough that 7-year-old executive prior 
employment ties are still influential, this would mean that (on average) outside CEOs are 
influenced during their entire tenure with the firm. Further, a survey of 5,000 executives 




3.2 years in 2007 (ExecNet, 2009). This suggests that seven years is a reasonable time 
cutoff for researchers’ consideration of these ties.  
Tie Strength  
“Most intuitive notions of the ‘strength’ of an interpersonal tie should be 
satisfied by the following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy 
(mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1361).  
While tie ‘strength’ has long been a part of the discussion, it is important to note 
that there are two inter-related yet distinct aspects of a relational tie that have been 
referenced as ‘tie strength’. First, there is the current strength of the tie. “Ties can be 
more or less preferential and stable, more or less trustworthy, and entail richer or more 
limited information exchange” (Baum et al., 2012: 529). Relational embeddedness 
emphasizes tie strength with a focus on the level of trust and the depth of information 
exchange (Uzzi, 1996). A stronger relationship exhibits higher levels of trust and 
therefore the potential for deeper exchanges of information.  
However, the current strength of a relational tie is dynamic, as each interaction 
can potentially strengthen or weaken it. For instance, abuse can weaken a relationship 
while demonstrating trust can strengthen it (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Further, the 
frequency and duration of interactions can affect the strength of a relational tie. Stronger 
relationships are typically forged with more frequent interactions and longer periods of 
time spent together. This environmental tendency to create a certain level of strength is 




Granovetter (1973) considers when discussing ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties. ‘Weak’ ties are 
more likely to be a source of novel information due to their social distance and 
infrequent interaction (Levin & Cross, 2004).  
In many cases, the subtle distinction between a relational tie currently being 
strong (weak) and being inside an environment that can forge a strong (weak) tie does 
not matter. However, in this study, the movement of the executive between industries 
that changes the environmental context makes the distinction crucial. The social distance 
between unrelated industries reduces the frequency of interactions and overlap between 
members of each industry that creates the likelihood of novel information between these 
groups. Because of this, a tie that bridges these groups would be considered ‘weak’ in 
Granovetter’s terminology. However, prior to changing industries, the executive would 
possess ‘strong’ ties to those in that industry (using the same terminology). I contend 
that while inside the ‘strong’ tie context of the prior industry, the executive developed 
relational ties that are ‘strong’ in the relational embeddedness meaning of the word. That 
is, ties with greater trust and information exchange (Baum et al., 2012; Uzzi, 1997) 
derived from the frequent interactions among socially close co-workers. Then once the 
executive changes industries, those ties become ‘weak’ in Granovetter’s terminology and 
therefore offer the potential for novel knowledge flow, but remain ‘strong’ from 
relational embeddedness perspective.  
It is this latter relational embeddedness strength of ties that I will consider as a 
moderator of the ‘weak’ ties that bridge socially distant industries. This idea of prior 




Research has shown that individuals with a history of interactions are more helpful and 
accessible (Cross & Sproull, 2004), provide more assistance to each other (Seibert et al., 
2001) and possess higher levels of trust (Levin & Cross, 2004). Thus, the strength of the 
individual relational ties of the executive at the time of exit from the industry will 
influence the amount and depth of information and knowledge that flows across the 
aggregate inter-industry tie. Therefore, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 3: The strength of the executive’s relational ties to the prior industry at 
the time of exit will moderate the relationship between an executive prior 
employment tie to an unrelated industry and acquisitions in that industry such that 
the relationship will be stronger, the stronger the ties are at exit.  
Tie Direction 
“This paper departs from most previous studies by exploiting a unique 
characteristic of social capital: the bidirectionality of social ties in the context 
of information transfer” (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010: 160). 
This study joins the previous few that consider the flow of information both to 
and from, a prior employer. Recent research has shown that exiting employees retain 
social ties with their former co-workers and that those ties are strong enough for 
knowledge flow in both directions (Agrawal et al., 2006). In fact, Corredoira and 
Rosenkopf (2010) specifically focused on ‘outbound mobility’. However, prior studies 
have not considered if prior employment tie directions have different levels of influence 
on the firm.  
Four conditions or cases make a received tie a stronger influence on the 




industry who are tied to a focal firm when the executive joins the focal firm (received) 
than exits it (sent). In the former case, the executive is tied to a multitude of individuals 
including former co-workers, suppliers, buyers and even competitors (Bergh, 2001). 
While in the latter, the focal firm’s co-workers (most importantly the top executives 
responsible for acquisition decisions) are only tied to the exiting executive. Therefore, 
the inter-industry tie that is an aggregate of the individual relational ties to unrelated 
industry represents many individuals in the nonfocal industry in a received tie but only 
one individual in a sent tie. This both increases the total unrelated industry knowledge 
accessible to the focal firm and decreases the reliance on any single relationship in a 
received tie. For instance, if the executive exits the focal firm on bad terms that could 
potentially remove any potential for future knowledge flow. 
Second, an executive joining a firm from another industry brings with him/her 
more than social ties to the focal firm. These transplant executives bring their human 
capital as well as their social capital from that industry. Much human capital does not 
typically transfer between unrelated industries as the firm-specific and industry-specific 
knowledge, skills and abilities don’t translate to the new context (Castanias & Helfat, 
2001). However, this is not case in selecting acquisition targets in one’s former industry. 
In this context, the industry-specific knowledge can be incredibly valuable to the focal 
firm in analyzing and selecting target firms. 
Fourth, the received tie possesses executive authority at the focal firm. That is, a 
received executive is currently employed by the focal firm and therefore directly guiding 




executive provides the former firm with only social capital based informational access to 
her/his new non-focal industry. 
Finally, executives may also be recruited to access their human and social capital 
resources not yet possessed by the firm (e.g., Rao & Drazin, 2002) before entering a new 
industry. In such cases, the firm may already be pre-disposed to engage in acquisition 
activity in the executive’s prior industry. While the frequency of such recruiting is 
unknown, it is unlikely that the opposite ever occurs: sending an executive to work in an 
unrelated industry instead of the focal firm as a pre-acquisition informational source. 
Because of these differences in combination, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 4: The direction of the executive mobility will moderate the 
relationship between an executive prior employment tie to an unrelated industry 
and acquisitions in that industry such that the relationship will be stronger for ties 




CHAPTER IV  
METHODS 
Sample & Data Sources 
My sample consisted of all the public U.S. firms in the ‘computers and office 
equipment’ industry (SIC 357) from 2002-2014. This industry was initially investigated 
as a potential sample because of anecdotal evidence that firms within it often engaged in 
unrelated acquisitions. This proved to be true as the 123 focal firms engaged in 648 
acquisitions during the sample 13-year period, of which 478 (74%) were in unrelated 
industries. For instance, Adaptec Inc., an enterprise and consumer computer data storage 
company, acquired Baseball Heaven, LLC. This sample was then selected as one with 
sufficient unrelated acquisitions for testing and as an industry representative of other 
high tech and dynamic industries. 
While the sample represents a possible panel of 1599 observations, not all of the 
firms existed for the entire time period, reducing the actual sample size to 1155 firm-
year observations. A small number of missing financial controls were replaced with 
averages to keep from dropping observations after determining that such replacements 
did not alter the results. 
Acquisition data, including the industry location (primary SIC) of all the 
acquisition targets of the focal firms, were collected from Thomson One (formerly SDC 
Platinum) including three additional years (1999-2001) for the prior acquisition 
experience control. Board interlock, employment history of the five highest paid 




starts in 2000 and expands to include many more firms from 2002 on. As of December 
2015, BoardEx had 92,498 individuals and 130,989 organizations in its database. 
Further, BoardEx creates a unique identifier for firms listed in executives’ work histories 
that are not already tracked by BoardEx. This raises the total number of firms possible 
for employment ties to 210,639 (16,279 public and 194,360 private). Financial control 
data were collected from Compustat North America. 
Dependent Variables 
Current research classifies an acquisition as unrelated if the acquiring firm and 
target firm have different primary SIC codes (Fan & Goyal, 2006). Following recent 
studies, unrelated industries are defined by 3-digit SIC excluding the focal industry 
(Lim, Das, & Das, 2009). An acquisition is defined as the takeover of an existing 
company or of any of its business units through either full ownership or a majority of 
controlling stock (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). 
Acquisition announcement dates were used instead of completion dates for three 
reasons. First, this study is interested in relational ties as an antecedent to firms engaging 
in unrelated acquisitions – not successfully completing those unrelated acquisitions. 
Second, the earlier announcement date is more appropriate to investigate the moderating 
effect of the decay of the prior employment tie, as the effect in question is the initiation 
of an acquisition, and the ties would be older by the completion of the acquisition. Third, 
as the effect of interest is the initiation of an acquisition, the announced date allows for 
better classifying whether prior relational ties were sent or received at the time the firm 




change if the executive in question changed firms between the announcement and 
completion of the merger. 
In the alternative-specific conditional logit multi-industry analysis (H1), each unrelated 
acquisition is considered as a separate ‘decision’ between the various ‘choices’ of 
unrelated industry locations. Specifically, the 11 most frequently appearing unrelated 
industries in the sample were used. Those industries’ in order of most to least-frequently 
chosen for unrelated acquisitions, with the frequency of acquisitions in the sample in 
parentheses, are as follows: computer programming, data processing, and other computer 
related services (327), electronic components and accessories (24), miscellaneous 
business services (21), communications equipment (10), management and public 
relations services (10), telephone communications (10), professional and commercial 
equipment and supplies (9), search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical, and 
nautical systems, instruments, and equipment (6), photographic equipment and supplies 
(4), motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (4), and miscellaneous investing (4). 
Data for this analysis are coded with a separate observation for each industry ‘choice’ 
for each unrelated acquisitions (11 industries * 399 unrelated acquisitions in those 
industries). The ‘choice’ is coded 1 for industry of the unrelated acquisition target and 0 
for all other industries. Robustness testing included fewer industry ‘choices’ in the 
analysis. 
In the panel logit single industry analysis (H2-4), as well as the clustered logit 
and panel negative binomial analysis, I measured the frequency of unrelated 




the unrelated industry: ‘computer programming, data processing, and other computer 
related services’ (SIC 737). Firm-years with no acquisition in that unrelated industry 
were coded 0. This is consistent with the approach used by Nadolska and Barkema 
(2014). 
Independent Variables 
Executive prior employment tie is dummy coded as 1, if there is at least one 
inter-industry tie created by an executive’s prior employment history between the focal 
firm and a firm in the same industry as the unrelated acquisition. I constructed a list of 
these ties using the employment history in BoardEx which includes 254,023 ‘senior 
managers’ defined as the five most highly compensated executives at each firm, each 
year. For each executive and year, a tie was created between the current employer of the 
executive and all of the prior employers at that point in time. Ties to non-focal firms 
within the focal industry (primary SIC code of 357) were removed, as were ties to firms 
where the SIC code was unknown. This left only ties to firms known to be in an 
unrelated industry.  
Tie strength was calculated as the number years of executive employment at 
each prior firm in the employment history; it was collected as an integer rounded down 
for each calendar year. If there was more than one tie between the focal firm and an 
unrelated industry, the strength is the average number of years per tie. 
Tie age was calculated as the years of since exiting each prior firm in the 
employment history for each tie; it was collected as an integer rounded down for each 




which were assigned a value of 0.1. If there was more than one tie between the focal 
firm and an unrelated industry, the age is the average number of years per tie. 
I use the terminology of ‘sent’ and ‘received’ ties routinely used in interlock 
research (Palmer et al., 1995) to describe the direction of the executive mobility between 
firms. That is, which firm is the current employer of the executive and which firm is the 
prior employer. Sent executive prior employment tie is a dummy, computed the same as 
executive prior employment tie described above, except all ties where the executive is 
still employed at the focal firm are excluded. This creates a subsample of ties that only 
includes where the executive has already exited the focal firm. Received executive prior 
employment tie is a dummy computed the same as executive prior employment tie 
described above, except all ties where the executive has already exited the focal firm are 
excluded. This creates a subsample of ties that only includes where the executive is still 
employed at the focal firm. 
Control Variables 
I control for the many influences of board interlocks as they are the “most well-
studied of all forms of executive ties” (Geletkanycz et al., 2001: 890). Board interlock 
tie is a dummy coded 1 if there is at least one inter-industry tie created by an interlocking 
directorate between the focal firm and a firm in the same industry as the unrelated 
acquisition. Similar to Beckman et al. (2004), I collected data on all inside and outside 
directors of the focal firms from BoardEx. Inside directors are executives and board 
members of the focal company and create sent ties when they sit on the board of another 




principally affiliated. Outside directors also create neutral ties to the focal firm from 
those firms on whose boards they sit (but with whom they are not principally affiliated). 
Similar to Haunschild (1998), this study considered all types of interlocks (Sent, 
Received, and Neutral) equally. 
I also include several relevant controls in my models. These controls are similar 
to those found in recent acquisitions studies (e.g., Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & 
Johnson, 2015; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014) As firm size measures are not 
interchangeable, it is important to justify the specific measure selected (Josefy, Kuban, 
Ireland, & Hitt, 2015). Scholars have shown firm size may influence acquisition 
behavior (Amburgey & Miner, 1992) and following recent studies (Gamache et al., 
2015) I controlled for it with the log of assets of the acquiring firm. 
I use year dummies to control for overall economic trends, potential bandwagon 
effects when other firms are acquiring in the same unrelated industry, and for other 
temporal influences on unrelated acquisitions (Nadolska & Barkema, 2014). 
I control for the impact of CEO turnover on overall acquisition strategy and the 
amount of scrutiny that investors place on acquisitions by a new CEO (Lant, Milliken, & 
Batra, 1992; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). New CEO is a dummy coded 1 for first year 
of new CEO.  
The amount of prior acquisitions may influence the number of future 
acquisitions. Following recent studies (Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012), I measured unrelated 
acquisition experience as the total unrelated acquisition activity over the previous three 




I controlled for firm slack using the firm’s current assets, divided by its current 
liabilities – the so-called ‘current ratio’ (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004), as managers 
may use free cash flow for acquisitions to increase their prestige, power, and 
compensation, regardless of whether the acquisitions enhance firm value (Jensen, 1986). 
 I control for capital structure (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002), with the debt to equity ratio (leverage) as it may affect the frequency of 
acquisitions (Jensen, 1986). 
 Consistent with Nadolska and Barkema (2014), I controlled for differences in 
the composition of board of directors by controlling for the board size and the average 
director tenure in years on the board. 
Analysis 
A less common type of analysis was required to analyze the multi-industry 
location possibilities of an unrelated acquisition while considering if ties matched the 
target firm’s industries. Traditional logit analysis with a dummy coded 1 if there is a 
matching tie, creates a selection bias because a ‘match’ can only occur when there is an 
acquisition. Further, coding such matching tie dummies is problematic with multiple 
locations possible in the dependent variable. For instance, the dummy for a tie to 
industry A should explain variance when the dependent variable target location is 
industry A, but not when it is industry B, C, or D. Likewise, the dummy for a tie to 
industry B should explain variance when the dependent variable target location is 




that cannot be accounted for with traditional logit analysis. However, this bias is 
controlled for with alternative specific conditional logit analysis. 
Stata’s asclogit (alternative specific conditional logit) fits McFadden’s choice 
model, which is a specific case of the more general conditional logistic regression model 
(McFadden, 1974). Asclogit requires multiple observations for each case (decision), 
where each observation represents an alternative that may be chosen (Stata, 2012). Due 
to sample size, the maximum number of industry location choices that could be 
considered by asclogit was 11. Industries with the most acquisitions in the sample were 
used to maximize the sample size and therefore the number of industries included in the 
analysis. Those industries’ SIC codes in order of most to least-frequently chosen for 
unrelated acquisitions, with the frequency of acquisitions in the sample in parentheses, 
are as follows: 737 (327), 367 (24), 738 (21), 366 (10), 874 (10), 481 (10), 504 (9), 381 
(6), 386 (4), 371 (4), and 679 (4). While 11 industries may seem a small portion of the 
40 different unrelated industry targets in the sample, it does include every industry with 
more than three total acquisition targets over the sample period and accounts for 83% of 
the total unrelated acquisitions in the sample.  
In my sample 327 (68%) of the total 478 unrelated acquisitions were in a single 
industry: the computer programming, data processing, and other computer related 
services industry (SIC 737). This subset of acquisitions allowed me to use traditional 
logit analysis on a single target industry, which avoids the issues of a multi-industry 




While focusing on a single unrelated industry is more limited for testing the main 
effect, it does allow for moderation testing, not possible with alternative specific 
conditional logit analysis. This single industry analysis was done with xtlogit. Stata’s 
xtlogit fits random-effects, conditional fixed-effects, and population-averaged logit 
models. Xtlogit is for panel data with a dependent variable that is nonzero, with 
nonmissing indicating a positive outcome and zero indicating a negative outcome (Stata, 
2012). A Hausman test showed individual level effects are uncorrelated with the other 
covariates in my model, allowing the use of random-effects in my analysis. I reported 





CHAPTER V  
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the primary 
variables in the models that test hypotheses 1-3. Correlation levels between the variables 
are low with the exception of executive prior employment tie, executive prior 
employment tie age, and executive prior employment tie strength. These higher 
correlations make sense as a tie must be present (coded 1) for it to have an age and 
strength level. Further when the executive prior employment tie absent, the tie itself, the 
tie age, and the tie strength would all be coded 0. Fortunately, the variance inflation 
factors are all below 3 for the variables in question, suggesting no problems of 
multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2008). Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for the primary variables in the models that test hypothesis 4 as subsample 
analysis was utilized test that moderation. Both the correlation levels between the 
variables and the variance inflation factors that are all below 2 for the variables in 
question suggests no problems of multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2008). 
Table 3 shows the results of the asclogit regressions for the unrelated acquisitions 
occurring in 11 unrelated industries where there were at least 4 acquisitions (see analysis 
section for listing). Hypothesis 1 stated that an executive prior employment tie to an 
unrelated industry increases the likelihood of an acquisition in that industry. Results 
show that firms with an executive prior employment tie to an unrelated industry are 3.10 




Robustness testing with different industry cut off points (models R1-R6 in Table 4) 
found very similar results. Further, robustness testing that excluded the unrelated 
industry with the greatest number of acquisition targets and then used different industry 
cut off points (models R7-R12 in Table 5) also found very similar results. Therefore, 
hypothesis 1 receives support and the result are robust. I have reported the results with 
the odds ratios, as they are easier to interpret than the logistic coefficients. 
Also notable is that a board interlock tie to the unrelated industry was generally 
found to lose statistical significance when the executive prior employment tie was added 
to the model. For instance, in the primary analysis, a board interlock tie was statistically 
significant in the controls only model 1, but became marginally significant in model 2, 
which added the executive prior employment tie. Further, in robustness testing, that a 
board interlock tie to the unrelated industry was marginally significant in the controls 
only models R3, R5, R9 and R11 and lost statistical significance when the executive 
prior employment tie was added in models R4, R6, R10 and R12.  
Table 6 shows the results of the xtlogit regressions for the unrelated acquisitions 
occurring in the ‘computer programming, data processing, and other computer related 
services’ industry (SIC 737). This single industry subsample accounts for 68% of the 
total unrelated acquisitions in the sample (327 of 473) and allows for moderation testing. 
In the controls model 3, there are three statistically significant control variables with 
positive coefficients: a board interlock to the unrelated industry (p<0.001), recent 
unrelated acquisition experience (p<0.001), and firm size (p<0.01). Model 4 in Table 6 




industry) and finds similar, but stronger results: firms with an executive prior 
employment tie to the ‘computer programming, data processing, and other computer 
related services’ industry are 6.55 times more likely to make an unrelated acquisition in 
that industry (p<.001). 
Hypothesis 2 stated that the greater the time since the executive left the prior 
industry, the weaker the relationship between executive prior industry ties and 
acquisitions in that industry. In model 5 of Table 6, the main effect of tie age is not 
found to be statistically significant. In model 6 of Table 6, the coefficient of the 
interaction of the age of the executive prior employment tie and prior employment tie is 
negative and statistically significant (p<0.05) as a predictor of an unrelated acquisition in 
that industry.4 The odds ratios for this relationship shows that an executive prior 
employment tie makes an unrelated acquisition in that industry 11.55 times, with each 
year since the executive left the prior employer reducing this by a factor of 0.91. This 
slow decay rate is depicted in Figure 4. At this rate of tie decay, a firm with an eight-
year-old prior employment tie to an unrelated industry is 6 times more likely to acquire 
from that industry than a firm without the tie. Further, the increased likelihood of the 
prior employment tie isn’t completely canceled out until approximately 26 years of tie 
age. Robustness testing found similar results. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 receives support.  
Hypothesis 3 stated that the strength of the executive’s relational ties to the prior 
industry at the time of exit will moderate the relationship between an executive prior 
                                                 
4 Note: As Executive Prior Employment Tie is binary, the main effect of the moderator drops out due to 




employment tie to an unrelated industry and acquisitions in that industry such that the 
relationship will be stronger, the stronger the ties are at exit. In Model 7 of Table 6, the 
strength of the executive ties in the prior industry at exit was found to have a statistically 
significant (p<0.05) effect. However, it was not found to have a statistically significant 
moderation effect on the relationship between the executive prior employment ties and 
unrelated acquisitions.5 The robustness testing also found this moderation not to be 
statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 does not receive support.  
Hypothesis 4 stated that the direction of the executive mobility moderates the 
relationship between executive’s prior industry tie and acquisitions in that prior industry 
such that the relationship is stronger for ties created by an executive joining the firm 
(than by one exiting the firm). This analysis was done by subsampling the executive 
prior employment ties. Only sent ties were included in model 9 and only received ties 
were included in model 10. Table 6 shows that a firm with a sent executive prior 
employment tie to an unrelated industry is 1.71 times more likely to acquire a target firm 
in that industry, but this effect is only marginally statistically significant (p<0.1). 
Meanwhile, Table 6 shows that a firm with a received executive prior employment tie to 
an unrelated industry is 3.66 times more likely to acquire a target firm in that industry 
(p<0.001). However, the difference between the coefficients was not found to be 
statistically significant (although it approached marginal significance at p=0.11), thus 
Hypothesis 4 fails to find support. These results do provide an interesting insight into the 
                                                 
5 Note: As Executive Prior Employment Tie is binary, the main effect of the moderator drops out due to 




relative influence of underlying factors of the two tie directions. I will discuss this 
further in the next section. 
Robustness & Post Hoc Analysis 
For robustness, I also ran asclogit with several other sample cutoff points to 
ensure I was not overfitting the model in my desire to include as many industries as 
possible. These cutoffs included industries with more than 5 acquisition targets across 
the sample period (8 industries), more than 8 acquisition targets (7 industries) and more 
than 9 acquisition targets (6 industries). The results are included in the appendix as 
models R1-R6 Table 4 and are very similar, suggesting that the results are robust and the 
model is not over-fitted.  
I also ran asclogit without the ‘computer programming, data processing, and 
other computer related services’ industry (SIC 737) to ensure that its large portion of the 
total unrelated acquisitions (68%) was not driving the results. The reduced sample size 
meant that the most industry choices I could test was 7 (industries with more than 5 
acquisitions in the sample). I also again varied the cutoff point of the sample and ran the 
analysis with more than 8 acquisition targets (6 industries) and more than 9 acquisition 
targets (5 industries). Note that the industry totals are one less than the above analysis at 
the same cut off point due to the exclusion of SIC 737. The results are included in the 
appendix as models R7-R12 in Table 5 and are very similar to those above, suggesting 
that they are robust and the large number of unrelated acquisitions in a single industry is 




For robustness, I also used Stata’s logit (clustered by firm) which fits a logit 
model for a binary response by maximum likelihood; it models the probability of a 
positive outcome given a set of regressors. Logit is for data with a dependent variable 
that is nonzero, with nonmissing indicating a positive outcome and zero indicating a 
negative outcome (Stata, 2012). For this analysis I clustered by firm, which specifies that 
the standard errors allow for intragroup correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that 
the observations be independent. That is, the observations are independent across groups 
(clusters) but not necessarily within groups (Stata, 2012). Results are reported in Table 7 
and are very similar to the xtlogit results, suggesting that they are robust.  
As a post hoc analysis, I also used negative binomial regression to consider firm-
years with multiple acquisitions in the subsample of the ‘computer programming, data 
processing, and other computer related services’ industry. Of the 149 firm-years with 
acquisition activity, 61 (41%) had multiple acquisitions. Almost half of those (28) 
represented two acquisitions with the maximum being four instances where a firm 
acquired ten targets in a single year. Stata’s xtnbreg which fits random-effects or 
conditional fixed-effects overdispersion models, and population-averaged negative 
binomial models for a nonnegative count dependent variable. Note that the ‘random’ and 
‘fixed’ effects of this analysis apply to the dispersion parameter distribution, not to the 
xβ term in the model (Stata, 2012). A Hausman test was still used to confirm that my use 
of random-effects was appropriate. Results appear in Table 8 and are similar to the 
above findings for the main effect of executive prior employment ties (model PH2). That 




board interlocks. However, none of the moderators are significant with this analysis 
(models PH3-PH8). This is likely due to the difference in dependent variable: acquisition 
activity in a specific industry location, versus the amount of acquisition activity in a 
specific industry location. For instance, while an older (decayed) tie may pass less 
information about the industry to the focal firm and therefore reduce the tie’s influence, 
a firm undertaking numerous acquisitions each year is likely more an indication of its 
size than its informational access. This supposition is at least hinted at with the increased 
significance of the firm size control, from generally being p<.05 in the xtlogit models to 





CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY & DISCUSSION 
 
A great deal of research has sought to understand why firms make acquisitions. 
In fact, the review by Haleblian et al. (2009) summarized the recent findings across 
fourteen acquisition antecedents. Yet, despite all we have learned as a field about these 
antecedents, a meta-analysis across acquisition studies suggest there are still unidentified 
variables that may explain significant post acquisition performance variance (King et al., 
2004). I proposed that some of this unexplained variance can be accounted for with a 
previously unconsidered type of inter-firm relational ties: executives’ prior employment 
ties.  
Social capital theory provided the theoretical framework for this study. First, 
inter-firm relational ties can serve as a conduit for information and knowledge transfer 
(Burt, 1992; Podolny, 2001). Second, socially distant ties are more likely to provide 
access to valuable, non-redundant information (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). As 
unrelated industries represent socially distant groups, unrelated acquisition activity 
provided an excellent context to test the influence of this previously unresearched type 
of inter-firm relational ties. I now turn to discussing the results of that testing and its 
implications. 
Hypotheses & Implications  
The first major empirical contribution of this study is showing that executives’ 




behavior. Testing across 6, 7, 8 and 11 unrelated industry choices, I consistently found 
that the presence of an executive prior employment tie to an unrelated industry made a 
firm three times as likely to engage in an acquisition in that industry. Further, 
specifically focusing on the most commonly selected unrelated industry, as well as 
removing it from the sample, both produced similar results. Additionally, this robust 
relationship between prior employment and current acquisitions was found while 
controlling for the influence of the often studied inter-firm relational ties of board 
interlocks (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998).  
The implications of this are far reaching, as scholars have largely viewed such 
ties as irrelevant (Burt 1992, 2002; Coleman 1990; Levin et al., 2011). Instead of 
irrelevance, executive prior employment ties had a stronger influence on unrelated 
industry chosen for an acquisition than do board interlocks. Theoretically this makes 
sense, as the strength of relational ties is due in part to the frequency of interactions and 
amount of time spent interacting (Granovetter, 1973). So executives’ ties to co-workers, 
where relational ties formed are during daily interactions, are likely much stronger than 
those ties formed with co-directors during intermittent board meetings.  
While this study only tested one strategic outcome, it certainly raises the question 
of whether executive prior employment ties have a stronger influence than board 
interlocks with other strategic outcomes. To date, the extant literature has found board 
interlocks to be predictive of many outcomes including strategic alliance partner 
selection (Beckman et al., 2004), emerging market entry (Tuschke, Sanders, & 




name a few. If the relative strength of these differing tie types holds in other areas, then 
executive prior employment ties will have far-reaching predictive power.  
Conversely, the fact that board interlock ties explained much less variance when 
examined in conjunction with executive prior employment ties raises important 
questions about the overall relational network. An important consideration in network 
analysis is including enough ties to adequately capture the relational network structure 
(Burt, 2007; Merluzzi & Burt, 2013). If not, what appears to be a structural hole may 
actually be full ties that are being ignored or otherwise excluded by researchers (Levin et 
al., 2011). See Figure 3 (Adapted from Figure 1 in Burt, 2007) for a visual representation 
of this. The fact that board interlocks often lost significance once the executive prior ties 
were included in the model suggests that network was not adequately captured by the 
interlocks alone. This study clearly shows that considering a relational network of only 
board interlocks is likely to overstate their influence on unrelated acquisition industry 
selection. This raises the possibility that the influence of board interlocks could be 
overstated in other areas as well without inclusion of the executives’ prior employment 
ties. These implications mean that prior employment ties should offer fertile ground for 
future research. 
The second major empirical contribution of this study is determining the decay 
rate for executives’ prior employment ties. While a few recent findings suggest that 
relational tie decay may be slow (Cohen et al., 2008; Levin et al., 2011), to my 
knowledge I am the first to empirically establish a specific rate of decay. In my analysis, 




executive’s prior employment tie is reduced to zero by approximately 26 years of tie 
decay.  
This finding that relational ties decay very slowly also represents a major 
theoretical contribution to the social capital literature. Prior studies had suggested that 
inactive ties are accessible for information for longer than three years (e.g., Levin et al., 
2011), however, the ability to reconnect prior ties goes far beyond this and in fact spans 
decades. This slow decay rate is especially important for strategic management research 
considering that in 2007 the average tenure was 6.8 years for CEOs (Patel & Cooper, 
2014) and just 3.2 years for other top executives (ExecNet, 2009). These short tenures 
coupled with the long lasting influence of prior employment ties suggest that a firm’s 
strategy will likely be influence by the executive team’s prior employment.  
This longevity of prior ties further underscores the above discussion regarding 
including enough ties to adequately capture the relational network structure (Burt, 2007; 
Merluzzi & Burt, 2013). With the possibility of decades of influence, researchers may 
need to consider an executive’s entire employment history. 
Further, the influence of prior employment ties raises the possibility of the 
continued influence of other tie types that are no longer current (i.e., are now prior). For 
instance, management scholars to date have only considered ties to other firms through 
current board interlocks. This study suggests that such ties could transfer knowledge 
even after the interlock is ‘broken’ by the executive leaving the nonfocal firm’s board. 
However, this effect is likely weaker and shorter-lived than that found with executive 




board meetings than the daily interactions typical of employment. Further, there are also 
fewer individuals to interact with in a board than in a firm. Nonetheless, while this effect 
is likely smaller and shorter-lived than prior employment, it is likely still influential on 
strategic outcomes for at least a few years and therefore should be examined in future 
research.  
This study did not find the expected moderating effect for the strength of the 
relational ties at the time of executive exit from the industry. There are a few possible 
explanations for this. First, it is possible that the majority of industry transplants were in 
the non-focal unrelated industry for long enough to reach a minimum threshold of 
strength required to maintain ties to co-workers for long periods of time. This would 
produce inadequate variance required to find an effect. The fact that a main effect of 
executive prior employment was found with a sample mean duration at the non-focal 
firms of only 2.3 years, suggests that the relational bonds from shared employment do 
strengthen quite rapidly. And such a low mean further suggests that the problem could 
be one of inadequate variance. If this is the root of the problem, it may persist with 
samples from other industries as the survey reported average executive tenure of 3.2 
years (ExecNet, 2009) suggests my sample is not far off from the norm. 
It is also possible that the number of years spent in the industry in question is too 
a coarse measure for the strength of the relational ties formed there. While the strength 
of relational ties tends to increase with time (Granovetter, 1973), differences in 
leadership style and personality may cause executives’ tie strengths to increase at 




well. For instance, while the trust crucial for greater information exchange would 
generally increase over time at a collegial workplace it may not at a firm with a cutthroat 
culture. 
It is important to point out that the main effect of tie strength was statistically 
significant with each year spent in the prior industry increasing the likelihood of an 
acquisition in that industry by 9%.6 The fact that this did not moderate the prior 
employment ties suggest that this variable may be capturing a human capital influence 
instead of a social capital one. As discussed previously, while human capital does not 
typically transfer well between unrelated industries as the firm-specific and industry-
specific knowledge, skills and abilities don’t translate to the new industry (Castanias & 
Helfat, 2001). In the context of selecting acquisition targets in one’s former industry, the 
transplant executive’s human capital can prove incredibly valuable to the focal firm. 
The next empirical contribution was the support for the bidirectionality of social 
ties information transfer (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) across these executive prior 
employment ties. That is, knowledge flows both ways between the prior firm and the 
current firm. Because of this, the focal firm can gain information about another industry 
from both their current executives who were once employed in that non-focal industry 
(received tie), as well as, prior executives who are currently employed in that non-focal 
industry (sent tie).  
                                                 





What was surprising was the similarity of the influence of the sent and received 
ties. While the informational benefit of sent and received executive prior employment 
ties is likely similar, executives employed at the focal firm (received tie) also possess 
non-focal industry specific human capital and executive authority at the focal firm. The 
transplanted executive’s personal knowledge from experience in the prior industry 
should assist the firm in analyzing and selecting acquisition targets in that industry. 
Further, an executive employed at the focal firm should at least have a voice (or more in 
the case of CEOs) in the focal firm’s acquisition activity –certainly more so than an 
executive that no longer works at the focal firm. I expected those two additional factors 
to produce a stronger influence than the informational access alone, and therefore 
predicted received ties to be a stronger influence on a firm’s acquisition activity than 
sent ties.  
However, while the coefficients were different in the predicted direction, the 
amount of difference was not found to be statistically significant. This finding has 
important implications. First, the influence of executive human capital brought over 
from the previous industry is either very small or the informational benefit of an 
executive exiting to another industry can serve as a comparable substitute to the 
recruited executive’s industry knowledge. Second, the influence of executive authority at 
the focal firm is either very small or is mitigated by the fact that sent ties are linked back 
to executive’s with authority at the focal firm. 
This study adds to the diversification literature by considering the industry 




unrelated acquisitions can used to balance the cyclical effects of revenue between 
industries (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Bergh, 1997). Further, unrelated acquisitions can 
lower the cost of capital (Chatterjee, 1986), or to create other financial gains (Bergh, 
1997; Seth, 1990). However, while diversification can help explain firms’ engaging in 
unrelated instead of related acquisitions, the research has rarely considered what 
influences a firm to choose one unrelated industry over another. This study expands our 
understanding of other factors in the selection of a specific unrelated industry location 
for acquisition activity. 
I contribute to literature on prior employment into the C-suite by testing it at the 
executive level. Extant research has primarily focused on the prior employment of non-
executives such as inventors (Agrawal et al., 2006; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) or 
professional service providers, such as accountants and lawyers, (Somaya et al., 2008; 
Wezel et al., 2006).  
This study also offers important practical implications. It shows that executives’ 
prior employment can have a significant effect on the strategic decisions that they make 
today. Research has shown that an executive’s career is continuous in nature (Cheramie, 
Sturman, & Walsh, 2007) from the individual’s perspective, but my findings expand this 
to the organizational level. Nothing demonstrates this potential for path dependence 
better than twenty-year-old ties to an unrelated industry influencing major firm 
decisions. 
Managerial knowledge of these influences can help executives make better 




access to valuable, non-redundant unrelated industry information has yet to be tested 
empirically, the reduction in information asymmetry should improve performance. Due 
to the relatively high cost of acquisition premiums compared to executive salaries, it 
could be cost-effective for firms to recruit an executive from an industry before engaging 
in acquisition activity there.  
Managerial knowledge of these influences can help executives predict 
competitors’ future acquisitions. Such competitive acumen (Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011) can 
give firms a competitive advantage by knowing what markets competitors are likely to 
enter in the future. This competitive intelligence is also very easy to gather as executive 
employment history is usually readily available online. 
A practical implication for researchers is the fact that the data are relatively easy 
to collect. Unlike most relational tie data that must be collected through surveys and 
similar to board appointment data, employment history can often be collected from 
secondary sources. The popularity of board interlock studies may be due at least in part 
to relatively easier data collection, as surveys of corporate elites are not easily obtained. 
This readily available, additional relational tie type will allow scholars to consider many 
future research questions. 
Finally, there is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the causality of 
social capital. The cross-sectional nature of many social capital studies has left questions 
as to the origin of the observed effects being the network ties or the actor. As Kwon and 
Adler (2014: 419) explain, “if a cross-sectional study detected a tendency of influential 




individuals had more ties or that those with more ties became influential”? Specific to 
interlocks, Martin et al. (2015: 237) note “Earlier cross-sectional studies of this 
relationship are open to the criticisms of reverse causality (i.e., better performing firms 
may have more opportunities for creating interlocks).” Portes and Vickstrom's (2011: 
465) recent review reexamined some of the cross-sectional evidence for the power of 
social capital from a highly citied work on the subject (i.e., Putnam, 2000) and found 
that “without including a time-sensitive measure, [the prior] analysis does not allow us 
to disentangle these effects and truly determine whether or not social capital is causing 
the positive effects observed” and “because the [social capital] index was measured 
contemporaneously with the dependent variable; it is not at all clear which comes first.” 
They further conclude: “Empirically, many of the alleged benefits of communitarian 
social capital turn out to be correlates, rather than consequences” (Portes & Vickstrom, 
2011: 476). This study addresses this issue through the use of a primary variable of 
interest with an inherent lag built into it. By definition, the influence of an executive’s 
prior employment on current acquisition activity contains this vital time lag. On average, 
this time difference was a little over three years. In some instances, however, it was 
more than twenty. 
Limitations & Future Research 
As with any study, this dissertation has limitations that should be considered in 
assessing the applicability and generalizability of the results. First, this study only 
considers the focal industry of ‘computers and office equipment’. While this industry is 




not generalizable to other types of industries. Future studies should examine other 
industry areas such as retail, financial or service industries ensure these results are 
consistent in other contexts. 
The focal firms in this study were limited to public companies in the United 
States. This creates a sample bias towards larger firms and against foreign-based ones. 
The former is more than likely offset by the fact that the firm outcome of concern was 
acquisitions, as acquiring firms tend to be larger in size. This focus on domestic firms 
may influence the results due to the U.S. regulations on acquisitions such as anti-trust 
laws. Future research should explore potential differences in the influence of executive 
prior employment ties and unrelated acquisitions amongst firms headquartered in other 
countries. 
Thankfully, the limitation of only public, U.S. firms is not shared by the 
executive prior employment data. BoardEx collects all available employment history of 
the current executives for each firm-year even if those firms are outside the firms they 
are focused on collecting data. This allows for prior employment ties to 16,279 public 
firms and 194,360 private firms – including foreign firms. One potential limitation of 
these data for this study is that it does not capture the sent ties of executives that left the 
firm prior to BoardEx’s data collection (2002 for most firms). This left censoring of the 
executive prior employment sent ties could further account for its weaker influence 
compared to received ties. 
While this study established that executive prior employment ties can serve as a 




address the absorptive capacity of the focal firm. That is, the ability of the tied-to 
executive(s) at the focal firm to absorb and process the information flowing through the 
prior employment tie and turn it into the useful knowledge for the firm. As firms’ 
absorptive capacity can vary (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), this aspect of this inter-
industry knowledge flow should be investigated in future research. 
While beyond the scope of this study, it is likely that some firms actively recruit 
executives from other industries prior to entering that market. Such recruitment is likely 
for the purpose of gaining access to the executive’s human and social capital in that 
other industry to assist in acquisitions there, and it would not necessarily change the 
findings of this study. However, future research could explore how often such 
recruitment occurs and if active recruitment from the non-focal industry increases the 
post-acquisition performance from those industries.  
The current measure of industry relatedness is coarse-grained. Current research 
classifies an acquisition as unrelated if the bidder and target have different SIC codes 
(Fan & Goyal, 2006). This is commonly done with 4 digit differences in SIC code 
considered a related industry and 3 digit differences considered an unrelated industry. 
(Lim, Das, & Das, 2009). This measure could be improved in future research.  
Following prior research (Fan & Goyal, 2006; Lin, 2014), a relatedness index 
(for industries) can be constructed using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis inter-
industry commodity IO flow tables. This allows for the relatedness of two industries to 
be assessed. The use of such an index would allow for the categorization of various 




‘related’ or ‘unrelated’. Once constructed, this relatedness index could be used to further 
test the information value of prior employment ties. Social capital theory would suggest 
that ties to less related industries are more likely to provide non-redundant (and therefore 
valuable) information to the focal firm (Burt, 1992).  
As suggested in the above discussion, future research should consider other firm 
level outcomes that could be influenced by executive relational ties. Strategic alliances 
are often a precursor to acquisitions and therefore present an obvious next step for 
scholars. But, many other dependent variables could be considered including the often 
studied firm performance, or even the formation of new board interlocks.  
Lastly, this study considered individual ties and tie level attributes. However, the 
data are available to analyze the network attributes of executive prior employment ties. 
This could be done separately or together with board interlock ties in a single relational 
network. Once constructed, attributes such as a firm’s centrality or its number of 
structural holes could be assessed across many firm level outcomes including firm 
performance and acquisition activity. 
Conclusion 
This research builds on and extends social capital theory and our knowledge of 
acquisition antecedents by considering the relational ties from executives’ prior 
employment across industries. I find that such a relational tie to an unrelated industry 
increases the likelihood of acquiring an unrelated target in that same industry. The age of 
the prior employment tie decreases this effect, but at such a rate that suggests relational 




unrelated industry has no impact on the effect, suggesting that most prior employment 
ties are strong enough for knowledge transfer. I also found the surprising result that sent 
executive prior employment ties possess comparable influence to their received 
counterparts, meaning that an executive exiting to another industry can be just as 
influential on a firm’s acquisition activity in that industry as the firm recruiting an 
executive from that industry. Overall, the effect of executive prior employment ties 
appears very robust and has important implications for future social capital and business 








 Adler, P. S. & Kwon, S. W. 2002. Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy 
of Management Review, 27(1): 17–40. 
 
Agrawal, A., Cockburn, I. & McHale, J. 2006. Gone but not forgotten: knowledge flows, 
labor mobility, and enduring social relationships. Journal of Economic Geography, 
6(5): 571–591. 
 
Ahuja, G. 2000. The duality of collaboration: Inducements and opportunities in the 
formation of interfirm linkages. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3): 317–343. 
 
Amburgey, T. L. & Miner, A. S. 1992. Strategic momentum: The effects of repetitive, 
positional, and contextual momentum on merger activity. Strategic Management 
Journal, 13(5): 335–348. 
 
Amihud, Y. & Lev, B. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 605–617. 
 
Barkema, H. G. & Schijven, M. 2008. Toward Unlocking the Full Potential of 
Acquisitions: The Role of Organizational Restructuring (vol 51, pg 696, 2008). 
Academy of Management Journal, 53(2): 202–202. 
 
Barkema, H. G. & Vermeulen, F. 1998. International expansion through start-up or 
acquisition: A learning perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1): 7–26. 
 
Batjargal, B. 2010. The effects of network’s structural holes: Polycentric institutions, 
product portfolio, and new venture growth in China and Russia. Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal, 4(2): 146–163. 
 
Baum, J. A. C., McEvily, B. & Rowley, T. J. 2012. Better with Age? Tie Longevity and 
the Performance Implications of Bridging and Closure. Organization Science, 23(2): 
529–546. 
 
Becker, G. S. 1962. Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 9–49. 
 
Beckman, C. M., Haunschild, P. R. & Phillips, D. J. 2004. Friends or strangers? Firm-
specific uncertainty, market uncertainty, and network partner selection. Organization 
Science, 15(3): 259–275. 
 
Beneish, M. D., Jansen, I. P., Lewis, M. F. & Stuart, N. V. 2008. Diversification to 






Bergh, D. D. 1997. Predicting divestiture of unrelated acquisitions: An integrative model 
of ex ante conditions. Strategic Management Journal, 18(9): 715–731. 
 
Bergh, D. D. 2001. Executive retention and acquisition outcomes: A test of opposing 
views on the influence of organizational tenure. Journal of Management, 27(5): 603–
622. 
 
Boeker, W. 1997. Executive migration and strategic change: The effect of top manager 
movement on product-market entry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2): 213–
236. 
 
Bouty, I. 2000. Interpersonal and interaction influences on informal resource exchanges 
between R&D researchers across organizational boundaries. Academy of 
Management Journal, 43(1): 50–65. 
 
Boyd, B. 1990. Corporate linkages and organizational environment: A test of the 
resource dependence model. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 419–430. 
 
Broschak, J. P. 2004. Managers’ mobility and market interface: The effect of managers’ 
career mobility on the dissolution of market ties. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
49(4): 608–640. 
 
Burt, R. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press 
 
Burt, R. S. 2007. Secondhand brokerage: Evidence on the importance of local structure 
for managers, bankers, and analysts. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 119–
148. 
 
Carpenter, M. A. 2002. The implications of strategy and social context for the 
relationship between top management team heterogeneity and firm performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(3): 275–284. 
 
Carpenter, M. A. & Wade, J. B. 2002. Microlevel opportunity structures as determinants 
of non-CEO executive pay. Academy of Management Journal, 45(6): 1085–1103. 
 
Castanias, R. P. & Helfat, C. E. 1991. Managerial resources and rents. Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 155–171. 
 
Castanias, R. P. & Helfat, C. E. 2001. The managerial rents model: Theory and empirical 





Chakrabarti, A., Hauschildt, J. & Süverkrüp, C. 1994. Does it pay to acquire 
technological firms? R&D Management, 24(1): 047–056. 
 
Chatterjee, S. 1986. Types of synergy and economic value: The impact of acquisitions 
on merging and rival firms. Strategic Management Journal, 7(2): 119–139. 
 
Chen, G., Hambrick, D. C. & Pollock, T. G. 2008. Puttin’ on the ritz: Pre-IPO enlistment 
of prestigious affiliates as deadline-induced remediation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 51(5): 954–975. 
 
Cheramie, R. A., Sturman, M. C. & Walsh, K. 2007. Executive career management: 
Switching organizations and the boundaryless career. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior, 71(3): 359–374. 
 
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A. & Malloy, C. 2008. The small world of investing: board 
connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116(5): 951–
979. 
 
Cohen, W. M. & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 128–152. 
 
Coleman, J. S. & Coleman, J. S. 1994. Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard 
university press. 
 
Connelly, B. L., Johnson, J. L., Tihanyi, L. & Ellstrand, A. E. 2011. More than adopters: 
Competing influences in the interlocking directorate. Organization Science, 22(3): 
688–703. 
 
Corredoira, R. A. & Rosenkopf, L. 2010. Should auld acquaintance be forgot? The 
reverse transfer of knowledge through mobility ties. Strategic Management Journal, 
31(2): 159–181. 
 
Cross, R. & Sproull, L. 2004. More than an answer: Information relationships for 
actionable knowledge. Organization Science, 15(4): 446–462. 
 
Davis, G. F. 1991. Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the 
intercorporate network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 583–613. 
 
Davis, M. S. 1971. That’s interesting. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1(2): 309–344. 
 
Dokko, G. & Rosenkopf, L. 2010. Social capital for hire? Mobility of technical 
professionals and firm influence in wireless standards committees. Organization 





Dunbar, R. I. 1993. Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(04): 681–694. 
 
ExecNet. 2009. Executive Job Market 2009 Intelligence Report. 295 Westport Avenue, 
Norwalk, CT 06851. 
 
Fan, J. P. & Goyal, V. K. 2006. On the patterns and wealth effects of vertical mergers. 
The Journal of Business, 79(2): 877–902. 
 
Fligstein, N. & Brantley, P. 1992. Bank control, owner control, or organizational 
dynamics: Who controls the large modern corporation? American Journal of 
Sociology, 280–307. 
 
Gamache, D., McNamara, G., Mannor, M. & Johnson, R. 2015. Motivated to Acquire? 
The Impact of CEO Regulatory Focus on Firm Acquisitions. Academy of 
Management Journal, amj–2013. 
 
Gargiulo, M. & Benassi, M. 2000. Trapped in your own net? Network cohesion, 
structural holes, and the adaptation of social capital. Organization Science, 11(2): 
183–196. 
 
Geletkanycz, M. A., Boyd, B. K. & Finkelstein, S. 2001. The strategic value of CEO 
external directorate networks: Implications for CEO compensation. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22(9): 889–898. 
 
Geletkanycz, M. A. & Hambrick, D. C. 1997. The external ties of top executives: 
Implications for strategic choice and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
42(4): 654–681. 
 
Granovetter, M. S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
1360–1380. 
 
Grinstein, Y. & Hribar, P. 2004. CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from 
M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(1): 119–143. 
 
Groysberg, B., Lee, L.-E. & Nanda, A. 2008. Can they take it with them? The portability 
of star knowledge workers’ performance. Management Science, 54(7): 1213–1230. 
 
Gulati, R. 1999. Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and 
firm capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20(5): 397–
420. 
 
Gulati, R. & Westphal, J. D. 1999. Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-




Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(3): 473–506. 
 
Haleblian, J., Devers, C. E., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M. A. & Davison, R. B. 2009. 
Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and 
Research Agenda. Journal of Management, 35(3): 469–502. 
 
Harford, J. & Li, K. 2007. Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of 
Acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance, 62(2): 917–949. 
 
Haunschild, P. R. 1993. Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on 
corporate acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 564–592. 
 
Haunschild, P. R. 1994. How much is that company worth?: Interorganizational 
relationships, uncertainty, and acquisition premiums. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 39(3): 391–411. 
 
Haunschild, P. R. & Beckman, C. M. 1998. When do interlocks matter?: Alternate 
sources of information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
815–844. 
 
Haynes, K. T. & Hillman, A. 2010. The effect of board capital and CEO power on 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 31(11): 1145–1163. 
 
Henderson, A. D. & Fredrickson, J. W. 2001. Top management team coordination needs 
and the CEO pay gap: A competitive test of economic and behavioral views. 
Academy of Management Journal, 44(1): 96–117. 
 
Higgins, M. C. & Gulati, R. 2006. Stacking the deck: The effects of top management 
backgrounds on investor decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 27(1): 1–25. 
 
Hitt, M. A., Harrison, J. S. & Ireland, R. D. 2001. Mergers & Acquisitions: A Guide to 
Creating Value for Stakeholders. Oxford University Press. 
 
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E. & Kim, H. 1997. International diversification: Effects on 
innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firms. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(4): 767–798. 
 
Hoitash, U. 2011. Should independent board members with social ties to management 
disqualify themselves from serving on the board? Journal of Business Ethics, 99(3): 
399–423. 
 
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 





Josefy, M. A., Kuban, S., Ireland, R. D. & Hitt, M. A. 2015. All things great and small: 
Organizational size, boundaries of the firm, and a changing environment. The 
Academy of Management Annals. 
 
Killworth, P. D., Johnsen, E. C., Bernard, H. R., Shelley, G. A. & McCarty, C. 1990. 
Estimating the size of personal networks. Social Networks, 12(4): 289–312. 
 
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M. & Covin, J. G. 2004. Meta-analyses of post-
acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(2): 187–200. 
 
Knoke, D. & Kuklinski, J. H. 1982. Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. 1996. What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning. 
Organization Science, 7(5): 502–518. 
 
Koka, B. R. & Prescott, J. E. 2002. Strategic alliances as social capital: A 
multidimensional view. Strategic Management Journal, 23(9): 795–816. 
 
Kwon, S.-W. & Adler, P. S. 2014. Social capital: Maturation of a field of research. 
Academy of Management Review, 39(4): 412–422. 
 
Lant, T. K., Milliken, F. J. & Batra, B. 1992. The role of managerial learning and 
interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration. 
Strategic Management Journal, 13(8): 585–608. 
 
Laumann, E. O. & Knoke, D. 1987. The organizational state: Social choice in national 
policy domains. Univ of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Leana, C. R. & Pil, F. K. 2006. Social capital and organizational performance: Evidence 
from urban public schools. Organization Science, 17(3): 353–366. 
 
Lester, R. H., Hillman, A., Zardkoohi, A. & Cannella, A. A. J. 2008. Former government 
officials as outside directors: The role of human and social capital. Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(5): 999–1013. 
 
Levin, D. Z. & Cross, R. 2004. The strength of weak ties you can trust: The mediating 
role of trust in effective knowledge transfer. Management Science, 50(11): 1477–
1490. 
 
Levin, D. Z., Walter, J. & Murnighan, J. K. 2011. Dormant ties: The value of 





Liebeskind, J. P., Oliver, A. L., Zucker, L. & Brewer, M. 1996. Social networks, 
learning, and flexibility: Sourcing scientific knowledge in new biotechnology firms. 
Organization Science, 7(4): 428–443. 
 
Lim, E. N. K., Das, S. S. & Das, A. 2009. Diversification Strategy, Capital Structure and 
the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998): Evidence from Singapore Firms. Strategic 
Management Journal, 30(6): 577–594. 
 
Lin, L.-H. 2014. Organizational structure and acculturation in acquisitions: perspectives 
of congruence theory and task interdependence. Journal of Management, 40(7): 
1831–1856. 
 
Lipman, F. D. 2000. The Complete Going Public Handbook: Everything You Need to 
Know to Successfully Turn a Private Enterprise Into a Publicly Traded Company. 
Prima Lifestyles. 
 
Martin, G., Gozubuyuk, R. & Becerra, M. 2015. Interlocks and firm performance: The 
role of uncertainty in the directorate interlock-performance relationship. Strategic 
Management Journal, 36(2): 235–253. 
 
Mattioli, D. & Strumpf, D. 2015. M&A Deal Activity on Pace for Record Year. Wall 
Street Journal. 
 
Maurer, I., Bartsch, V. & Ebers, M. 2011. The value of intra-organizational social 
capital: How it fosters knowledge transfer, innovation performance, and growth. 
Organization Studies, 32(2): 157–185. 
 
McFadyen, M. A. & Cannella, A. A. 2004. Social capital and knowledge creation: 
Diminishing returns of the number and strength of exchange relationships. Academy 
of Management Journal, 47(5): 735–746. 
 
Merluzzi, J. & Burt, R. S. 2013. How many names are enough? Identifying network 
effects with the least set of listed contacts. Social Networks, 35(3): 331–337. 
 
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T. G. & Porac, J. F. 2004. Are more resources always better for 
growth? Resource stickiness in market and product expansion. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25(12): 1179–1197. 
 
Mizruchi, M. S. 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of 
research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 271–298. 
 
Mouw, T. 2003. Social capital and finding a job: Do contacts matter? American 





Nadolska, A. & Barkema, H. G. 2014. Good learners: How top management teams affect 
the success and frequency of acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 35(10): 
1483–1507. 
 
Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. 1998. Social capital, intellectual capital, and the 
organizational advantage. Academy of management review, 23(2): 242–266. 
 
Palmer, D. A., Jennings, P. D. & Zhou, X. G. 1993. Late adoption of the multidivisional 
form by large United States corporations - Institutional, political and economic 
accounts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(1): 100–131. 
 
Palmer, D., Barber, B. M., Zhou, X. & Soysal, Y. 1995. The friendly and predatory 
acquisition of large US corporations in the 1960s: The other contested terrain. 
American Sociological Review, 469–499. 
 
Patel, P. C. & Cooper, D. 2014. The harder they fall, the faster they rise: Approach and 
avoidance focus in narcissistic CEOs. Strategic Management Journal, 35(10): 1528–
1540. 
 
Peng, M. W. 2004. Outside directors and firm performance during institutional 
transitions. Strategic Management Journal, 25(5): 453–471. 
 
Podolny, J. M. 2001. Networks as the pipes and prisms of the market. American Journal 
of Sociology, 107(1): 33–60. 
 
Portes, A. & Sensenbrenner, J. 1993. Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on the 
social determinants of economic action. American Journal of Sociology, 1320–1350. 
 
Portes, A. & Vickstrom, E. 2011. Diversity, social capital, and cohesion. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 37: 461–479. 
 
Putnam, R. D. 1993. The prosperous community: social capital and public life. The 
American Prospect, (13). 
 
Rao, H. & Drazin, R. 2002. Overcoming resource constraints on product innovation by 
recruiting talent from rivals: A study of the mutual fund industry, 1986-94. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45(3): 491–507. 
 
Reagans, R. E. & Zuckerman, E. W. 2008. Why knowledge does not equal power: the 
network redundancy trade-off. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(5): 903–944. 
 
Reuer, J. J., Tong, T. W. & Wu, C.-W. 2012. A Signaling Theory of Acquisition 






Romanelli, E. & Tushman, M. L. 1994. Organizational transformation as punctuated 
equilibrium: An empirical test. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5): 1141–1166. 
 
Sandefur, R. L. & Laumann, E. O. 1998. A paradigm for social capital. Rationality and 
Society, 10(4): 481–501. 
 
Seibert, S. E., Kraimer, M. L. & Liden, R. C. 2001. A social capital theory of career 
success. Academy of Management Journal, 44(2): 219–237. 
 
Seth, A. 1990. Sources of value creation in acquisitions: an empirical investigation. 
Strategic Management Journal, 11(6): 431–446. 
 
Shipilov, A. V. & Li, S. X. 2008. Can you have your cake and eat it too? Structural 
holes’ influence on status accumulation and market performance in collaborative 
networks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 53(1): 73–108. 
 
Slotte-Kock, S. & Coviello, N. 2010. Entrepreneurship research on network processes: a 
review and ways forward. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(1): 31–57. 
 
Somaya, D., Williamson, I. O. & Lorinkova, N. 2008. Gone but not lost: The difference 
performance impacts of employee mobility between cooperators versus competitors. 
Academy of Management Journal, 51(5): 936–953. 
 
Sorenson, O. & Rogan, M. 2014. (When) Do organizations have social capital? Annual 
Review of Sociology, 40: 261–280. 
 
Stata. 2012. Stata 12 Reference Manual. Stata Press: College Station, TX. 
 
Stearns, L. B. & Mizruchi, M. S. 1993. Board composition and corporate financing - The 
impact of financial institution representation on borrowing. Academy of Management 
Journal, 36(3): 603–618. 
 
Still, M. C. & Strang, D. 2009. Who does an elite organization emulate? Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 54(1): 58–89. 
 
Sundaramurthy, C., Pukthuanthong, K. & Kor, Y. 2014. Positive and negative synergies 
between the CEO’s and the corporate board’s human and social capital: A study of 
biotechnology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6): 845–868. 
 
Tsai, W., Su, K.-H. & Chen, M.-J. 2011. Seeing through the eyes of a rival: Competitor 






Tuschke, A., Sanders, W. M. G. & Hernandez, E. 2014. Whose experience matters in the 
boardroom? The effects of experiential and vicarious learning on emerging market 
entry. Strategic Management Journal, 35(3): 398–418. 
 
Uzzi, B. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic 
performance of organizations: The network effect. American Sociological Review, 
61(4): 674–698. 
 
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1): 35–67. 
 
Vasudeva, G., Zaheer, A. & Hernandez, E. 2013. The embeddedness of networks: 
institutions, structural holes, and innovativeness in the fuel cell industry. 
Organization Science, 24(3): 645–663. 
 
Vermeulen, F. & Barkema, H. 2001. Learning through acquisitions. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44(3): 457–476. 
 
Vermeulen, F. & Barkema, H. 2002. Pace, rhythm, and scope: Process dependence in 
building a profitable multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal, 
23(7): 637–653. 
 
Westphal, J. D. 1999. Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance 
consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1): 7–
24. 
 
Westphal, J. D. & Bednar, M. K. 2005. Pluralistic ignorance in corporate boards and 
firms’ strategic persistence in response to low firm performance. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 50(2): 262–298. 
 
Westphal, J. D., Seidel, M. D. L. & Stewart, K. J. 2001. Second-order imitation: 
Uncovering latent effects of board network ties. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
46(4): 717–747. 
 
Wezel, F. C., Cattani, G. & Pennings, J. M. 2006. Competitive implications of interfirm 
mobility. Organization Science, 17(6): 691–709. 
 
Woolcock, M. 2010. The rise and routinization of social capital, 1988-2008. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 13: 469–487. 
 
Yang, M. & Hyland, M. 2006. Who do firms imitate? A multilevel approach to 




Management, 32(3): 381–399. 
 
Zaheer, A. & Bell, G. G. 2005. Benefiting from network position: Firm capabilities, 
structural holes, and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(9): 809–825. 
 
Zona, F., Gomez-Mejia, L. R. & Withers, M. C. 2015. Board interlocks and firm 







APPENDIX A - FIGURES 
 
 










































APPENDIX B - TABLES 
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Table 8 – Post Hoc: Xtnbreg Results  
 
 
